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2I. Introduction –  Reverse Moderate Relativism:  The 
Missing Piece to the Universality Debate
The question of the universality of human rights norms has challenged scholars and 
commentators for decades.1  It is a highly important question from a pragmatic standpoint, because 
human rights are sure to be ignored if they are not culturally relevant.2  Because cultural legitimacy is so 
crucial to compliance, efforts to actively engage local and international law in the effort to seek universal 
values should be applauded.  These efforts take three different forms.  On one extreme, universalists 
1 See, e.g., Kimberly Younce Schooley, Comment, Cultural Sovereignty, Islam, and Human Rights, Toward a 
Communitarian Revision, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 651, 678-79 (1994); HENRY J STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON (eds.), 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 366-403 (2000) (citing K. DALACOURA, 
ISLAM, LIBERALM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); E. COTRAN AND A. SHERIF, EDS., DEMOCRACY, 
THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM (1999); A. POLLIS & P. SCHWAB, EDS., HUMAN RIGHTS:  CULTURAL 
AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1979); T. DUNNE & N. WHEELER, EDS., HUMAN RGIHTS IN 
GLOBAL POLITICS (1999); ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY:  THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES 
IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights,  49 AMER. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST N. 4 539 (1947); CULTURE AND RIGHTS:  ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(JANE K. COWAN ET AL, EDS., 2001); ADAM KUPER, CULTURE:  THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 
(1999); Pannikar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?  120 DIOGENES 75 (1982); Rhoda Howard, 
Dignity, Community, and Human Rights, in ABDULLAHI AN-NA’IM, ED., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 81 (1991); Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im, Human Rights in Muslim World: Socio-
Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, 3 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 13 (1990); Oscar Schachter, 
Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 Am. J. Int. L. 848 (1983)); Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human 
Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
REVIEW 303 (1982); Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Governance: The Asian Debate, 15 AUSTRALIAN YEAR BOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1994); Michael Perry, Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and 
Related Matters, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 468 (1997);; A D RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: 
UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Rein Mullerson, Universal Human Rights in the Multicultural World: 
Reasons and Excuses for, and Circumstances Conducive to their Gross and Systemic Violation, in MEGHNAD DESAI 
& PAUL REDFERN (eds.), GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD ORDER 133(1995); 
Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 316 
(1996); UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 91-118 (2002); Fernando R Teson, International Human 
Rights and Cultural Relativism, in PHILIPS ALSTON (ed.), HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 117 (1996); Michael Goodhart, 
Origin and Universality in the Human Rights Debate: Cultural Essentialism and the Challenge of Globalisation 25 
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 935 (2003); Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Universalist Controversy. A 
Response to Are the Principles of Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the "Asian" Concept 
of Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, by Dr. Surya P. Subedi, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 71 (1999); 
John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1996); Fernando R. 
Tesón, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA. J. INT’L L. 869 (1984-1985); Christina M. 
Cerna, Univesality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity:  Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-
Cultural Contexts, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 740 (1994); Reza Afshari, An Essay on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the 
Discourse of Human Rights 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 235 (1994).
2
 Ahmad An-Na’im, Human Rights in Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, supra 
note 1, at 15 (“[H]uman rights violations reflect the lack or weakness of cultural legitimacy of international 
standards in a society.  Insofar as these standards are perceived to be alien to or at variance with the values and 
institutions of a people, they are unlikely to elicit commitment or compliance.”).
3argue that all human rights are applicable in all cultures,3 an untenable stance because it eliminates the 
tensions between various cultures simply by ignoring them.  A much more realistic approach is offered by 
the moderate cultural relativists, who accept cultural differences but still strive to find a core group of 
universal norms.4 In the area of Islamic law, moderate cultural relativism is best represented by the 
outstanding work of Professor Abdullahi Ahmad An-Na’im to interpret the Qur’an and Sunna consistent 
with international human rights norms.5   Moderate cultural relativists such as An-Na’im have accepted 
equality as a core right shared across cultures, and their work analyzing equality of the sexes6 and of 
3 Schooley, supra note 1, at 691-98.
4
 The term “moderate” distinguishes moderate cultural relativism from strict cultural relativism, a theory holding 
that because cultural variation is so great, there are no universally shared norms of any kind.  Schooley, supra note 
3, at 679-82.  Because this article is premised on the believe that some shared norms do transcend cultures, strict 
cultural relativism is not discussed further. 
5 See, e.g., A. AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION:  CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); An-Na’Im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim 
Context, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1987); An-na’im, Islamic law, International Relations and Human Rights:  
Challenge and Response, 20 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 17 (1987); An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World:  
Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, supra note 1, at 46-52.
6 See, e.g., Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 
202, 208 (1990) (describing the issue of sexual equality as “[p]robably the most celebrated inequality under 
traditional Islamic law”); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Human Rights in the Muslim World:  Socio-Political 
Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives, A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 36-46 (1990) 
(hereinafter “Scriptural Imperatives”)  (noting that “[t]he most important general principle of Shari’a influencing the 
status and rights of women is the notion of qawama (citing HOLY QUR’AN 4:34:  “Men have qawama 
[guardianship and authority] over women because of the advantage they [men] have over them [women])).; An-
Na’Im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim Context, supra note 5; Rebecca J. Cook, 
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT’L 
L.  643 (1990); Leila P. Sayeh and Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women:  An Incomplete 
Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 311 (1995); Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and 
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:  Are the Shari’a 
and the Convention Compatible? 44 AM. U.L. REV. 1949 (1995); ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 97-130 (1999).  Under Islamic law, women generally cannot 
hold a political or judicial office, An-Na’im, Scriptural Imperatives, supra, at 37, sometimes lack capacity to initiate 
a marriage contract or obtain a unilateral divorce, Arzt, supra, at 223, and may inherit half as much as an equally 
situated male.  Id. at 208.    Monetary compensation for violent crimes (diya) is less for female victims than for 
male, An-Na’im, Scriptural Imperatives, supra, at 39, and a woman’s testimony in court is valued at half that of a 
man’s.  HOLY QUR’AN 2:282 (N.J. DAWOOD, TRANS., 1999); Arzt, supra, at 208; An-Na’im, Scriptural 
Imperatives, supra, at 39.  According to some interpretations of Shari’a (some of which state-sanctioned), her 
husband may chastise her, including “light beating,” Arzt, supra, at 208, demand intercourse at any time, and restrict 
her freedom of movement.  See, e.g. Human Rights Committee: Third Periodic Report of Yemen, ¶ 141, UN Doc.; 
CCPR/C/YEM/2001/3 (Oct. 18, 2001) (“A husband has a right to his wife’s obedience in matters affecting the 
family’s interests, particularly with regard to the following:  She must … permit him to live with her and enjoy 
access to her, … permit him to have licit intercourse with her, …  obey his orders without obstinacy and perform her 
work in the conjugal home, … not leave the conjugal home without his permission”).  Many commentators also 
consider polygamy fundamentally incompatible with international human rights standards  An-Na’im, Scriptural 
Imperatives, supra, at 38-39; Arzt, supra, at 222-23.
4religious groups7 in Islam has been extensive, certainly controversial,8 but in my view highly valuable.9
Similarly, the practical effects of moderate cultural relativism are evident in the momentous legal and 
7 See, e.g., Riffat Hassan, Religious Human Rights and the Qu'ran, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 85 (1996); 
Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Islamic Foundations of Religious Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 337 (J. WITTE, JR., & J.D. VAN DER VYVER, EDS., 1996); Arzt, supra note 6, at 
208-09; MAYER, supra note 6, at 131-174.  Compare HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 9:5 (“Slay them [those 
who do not believe in revealed scriptures] wherever you may find them”); Id. at 3:85 (“If anyone desires a religion 
other than Islam, never will it be accepted of him; and in the hereafter he will be among the losers”); to Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.  Doc. A/810 (1948) (hereinafter 
“UDHR”) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”); UDHR, supra at Art. 2 
(“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, 
such … religion”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18, Dec. 19 1966 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976)  999 U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter “ICCPR”) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as … religion”).  See also Arzt, supra note 6, at 223 (reporting that 
“the principles of religious freedom and nondiscrimination against religious minorities are now constitutionally 
protected in the majority of Islamic states,” but noting that “some such provisions are in conflict with other 
constitutional sections that establish Islam as the official state religion or Shari’a as a principle source of 
legislation”).  Compare also An-Na’am, Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 23 (“According to Shari’a, a 
Muslim who repudiates his faith in Islam, whether directly or indirectly, is guilty of a capital offense punishable by 
death”), with UDHR, supra, at Art. 18 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief”) (emphasis added); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 18 (“Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and … [n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice”).  But see HOLY QUR’AN, supra, at 2:256 (“There should be 
no compulsion in religion”).
8
 An-Na’im’s approach is controversial particularly because he advocateds expanding the scope of ijtihad (Islamic 
legal reasoning) “to enable modern Muslim jurists … to substitute previously enacted texts with other, more general, 
texts of Qur’an and Sunna [the two principle textual sources of Islamic Law] despite the categorical nature of the 
prior texts.”  An-Na’am, Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 49.  He defends this technique on the grounds that 
“the proposed new rule would also be based on the Qur’an or Sunna, albeit on a new interpretation of the text,” Id., 
but admits that this approach is sure to meet resistance.  Id. at 51.  See also FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM & 
MODERNITY 142 (1982) (“It is … something of an irony to pit the so-called Muslim fundamentalists against the 
Muslim modernists, since, so far as their acclaimed procedure goes, the Muslim modernists say exactly the same 
things as the so-called Muslim fundamentalists say:  that Muslims must go back to the original and definitive 
sources of Islam and perform ijtihad on that basis.”).
9 Moderate cultural relativists also argue for a re-interpretation of Islamic law towards international standards in the 
areas of criminal defense rights, freedom from slavery, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination.  On criminal 
defense rights, particularly the use of criminal penalties as retaliation (qisas), Compare Arzt, supra note 6, at 208 
(“Islamic law provides for penalties not to promote rehabilitation of the criminal but as a retaliation (qisas), either by 
financial extraction or bodily mutilation”) with UDHR, supra note 7, at Art. 5 (“No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”); ICCPR, supra note 7, at Art. 7 (“No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”).  On slavery, Compare An-Na’im, 
Scriptural Imperatives, supra note 6, at 22 (“Although slavery was formally abolished in all Muslim countries 
through secular law, the institution itself remains lawful under Shari’a to the present day”), with UDHR, supra, at 
Art. 4 (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 8 (“No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms 
shall be prohibited. No one shall be held in servitude”).  On freedom of expression, Compare An-Na’im, supra, at 
23 (“The Shari’a law of apostasy can be used to restrict other human rights such as freedom of expression”), with 
UDHR, supra, at Art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 
19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression”).  On non-discrimination, An-Na’im describes a 
5political efforts to reinterpret Muslim status law consistent with human rights instruments, first in Tunisia 
a half century ago, and currently in Morocco.10
Concurrent with these laudable efforts, however, another discourse is also warranted:  As scholars 
continue to analyze, influence, and advocate for a legal shift towards an international standard in some 
areas, such as women’s rights, there should be a concurrent dialogue examining the extent to which 
international human rights law can or should move towards a more Islamic standard in other domains, an 
opinion advanced by An-Na’im in his later work, noting that “the human rights movement cannot achieve 
its objectives without strong and sustained political support form different constituencies … [and] is 
unlikely to achieve this degree and quality of political support … so long as there is a perception of 
exclusive Western authorship of the concept of human rights and its normative implications.”11  In a 
previous work, I therefore proposed a new theory, reverse moderate relativism; like moderate cultural 
relativism, reverse moderate relativism also seeks to develop a core set of shared rights concepts across 
cultures, but it does so “in reverse,” using other legal and cultural systems as the neutral benchmark to be 
achieved by international human rights law.12  Without claiming any past causative link in the 
three-tiered rights entitlement based on religious adherence under Shari’a, including Muslims; Ahl al-Kitab, 
believers in a divinely revealed scripture such as Christians and Jews; and non-believers.  Muslims are full citizens 
enjoying all Shari’a rights and freedoms.  Ahl al-Kitab hold the status of dhimma, a compact with the Muslim state 
guarantying them inferior rights and freedoms to Muslims, including lack of equality with Muslims, a lower diya 
(financial compensation for murder or bodily harm) than Muslims, non-application of the Muslim hadd of qadhf  
(“criminal penalty for the unproven accusation of fornication”), inability of a dhimmi man to marry a Muslim 
woman, and subjection to a jizya poll tax.  The rights of unbelievers are limited even further, with recognition as 
dhimmis as a best-case scenario.   An-Na’im, supra, at 24-25.  To this, compare UDHR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as … 
religion”); ICCPR, supra, at Art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to 
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as … religion”);  but see HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at ** (“You all are 
descendants of Adam and Adam is from the Earth.  The Arab amongst you has no merit over the non-Arab save with 
piety.”).
10 See Tewfik Hakem, Les Députés Marocains ont Adopté à l’unanimité l’égalité juridique entre hommes et femmes, 
LE MONDE  (Jan. 19, 2004), at 4.
11
 Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance:  The Case of Collective Rights, in THE 
ROLE OF THE NATION-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 7 (MONIQUE CASTERMANS-HOLLEMAN ET AL., EDS., 
1998).
12
 Jason Morgan-Foster, A New Perspective on the Universality Debate:  Reverse Moderate Relativism in the Islamic 
Perspective, ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. (forthcoming 2003).  Upon reflection, reverse moderate relativism shares 
many common assumptions with Dianne Otto’s “transformative” approach to international human rights, and she 
should be credited accordingly.  See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 
6development of international law,13 reverse moderate relativism rather is concerned with future
development of universal norms, arguing for a restructuring of the universality debate from Western 
neutrals to local neutrals.14  It is only through the combined use of moderate cultural relativism in certain 
areas (such as equality), and reverse moderate relativism in others (such as, I will argue here, solidarity 
rights), that the most appropriate core set of universal human rights norms can be established, a set of 
rights which is neither neo-colonialist15 nor apologistic.16
With this goal in mind, this article applies reverse moderate relativism in the Islamic context, 
recognizing and analyzing one potential area where the efforts to find universal human rights norms 
should begin with the teachings of Islamic law:  the importance of individual duties, and their role in 
shaping the so-called “third generation” of human rights.  Although several scholars have discussed the 
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 1 (1997); Dianne Otto, Everything Is Dangerous: Some Poststructural Tools 
for Rethinking the Universal Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law, AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. (1998); Dianne 
Otto, Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative Possibilities in International Human Rights Law, AUSTL. 
Y.B. INT'L L. (1997).  Professor An-Na’im, in addition to his excellent work in moderate cultural relativism, has 
also advocated reverse moderate relativism, arguing, consistent with this article, that an emphasis on solidarity rights 
in the international human rights movement would add legitimacy to the quest for universal norms by emphasizing 
non-western traditions.  See An-Na’im, supra note 11.  But, whereas An-Na’im focuses on the group right 
component of solidarity rights, this article focuses on their individual duty component.
13
 For such an attempt, albeit in the domain of international law generally and not international human rights law, 
see Marcel A Boisard, On the Probable influence of Islam on Western Public and International Law, 2 INTL. J. 
MIDDLE E. STUD. 429 (1980).  Boisard’s work provides forceful evidence of the Islamic influence on 
international legal concepts as varied as humanitarian law, jus in bello, diplomatic immunity, commercial law, 
maritime law, due process, equity, good faith, pacta sunt servanda, and the foundational work of Grotius.  But, her 
analysis is more historical than legal, and she admits that it represents only a “modest attempt” to begin assessing 
the influence of Islam on international legal thought, and “[a] more complete study … remains to be done.”  Id. at 
429-30.
14
 This is a particularly novel argument in the context of Islamic law, as the very idea that Islamic law may have 
something to teach international human rights law has been noticeably absent from Western scholarship.  Professor 
Ann Mayer notes that “Islamic law and Islamic thought have been treated as irrelevant by people involved in the 
development of international human rights law.  A study of serious treatises by recognized specialists on the 
development of international human rights law will not reveal claims on behalf of the possibility of Islamic 
inspiration for international human rights law or its historical antecedents.”  ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  TRADITION AND POLITICS 46 (1991) [re-cited because different edition than that 
cited supra note 6].
15
 Dr. Adbulaziz Othman Altwaijri, Human rights in Islamic Teachings, ISLAMIC EDUTATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC 
AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (ISESCO), at 22-23 (1421H/2001) (noting that although Islamic scholars 
“recognize the international legitimacy of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, … [m]any thinkers and 
philosophers have started to oppose the western tendency to impose a western interpretation and application of 
[it].”).
16
 In this author’s view, women’s rights and rights of non-Muslims are two such areas in which the international 
human rights movement should not look upon Islamic law apologetically, and in these areas moderate cultural 
relativism (interpretation of local norms towards international norms) is more appropriate than reverse moderate 
relativism (recognizing the movement of international norms towards local norms).  See supra note 6. 
7importance of individual duties in local and regional legal traditions,17 including several examinations of 
the role of duties in Islamic law,18 no scholar has examined the potential of Islamic conceptions of duties 
to influence our understanding of third generation rights in the context of the debate on the universality of 
human rights.19  By attempting this goal, this article will help make the case that, as the international 
human rights movement progressively recognizes the importance of human duties,20 a core shared 
universal norm will develop with local tradition as its roots.    
17
 Makau wa Mutua has compellingly revealed the strong presence of duties in African traditions, as codified by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.  Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural 
Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995).  See also Michael C. Davis, 
Constitutionalism And Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights And Asian Values 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 109 (1998).  Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Special Rapporteur on the question of human rights and 
responsibilities, examined the use of duties in several regional legal traditions in his initial report.  See Human 
Rights and Human Responsibilities, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martínez, Special Rapportuer appointed by the 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to undertake the study requested by the 
Commission in its resolution 2000/63, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/107 (19 Mar. 2002) (hereinafter “Report of SR 
Martínez”) at paras. 66-76 (duties in the inter-American human rights system), paras. 77-81 (duties in the African 
system), paras. 82-84 (duties according to the Cairo Declaration), and paras. 85-86 (duties according to the Helsinki 
Final Act).  See also Damien Keown, Are There "Human Rights" in Buddhism?  2 J. OF BUDDHIST ETHICS
(1995) available at: http://www.urbandharma.org/udharma/humanrights.html; Editorial, Human Rights: Knots and 
Webs, HINDUISM TODAY (1996) available at: http://www.hinduism-today.com/1996/6/1996-6-07.html; Joseph 
Chan "Human Rights and Confucian Virtues", 4 HARVARD ASIA Q. (2000) available at:
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200003/0003a006.htm.
18 See Ahmad Farrag, Human Rights and Liberties in Islam, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:  
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 133, 134-46 (BERTING ET AL., EDS., 1990); Ebrahim Moosa, The 
Dilemma Of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185 (2000); Muhammad Tal‘at Al-Ghunaimi, Justice 
and Human Rights in Islam, in JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1, 6 (Gerald E. Lampe ed., 1997).
19
 In fact, the vast majority of comparative scholarship on Islamic law and international law never leaves the 
defensive paradigm at all, content to defend Islamic law against an international standard, rather than promote the 
adoption of Islamic legal precepts in international law.   MAYER, supra note 14, at 46 (“Questions of Islamic law 
are only occasionally mentioned in scholarly writing on international human rights – for the sake of comparison with 
the international norms or to illustrate the problems of introducing international norms in areas of the developing 
world”).   Unfortunately, this is even true with respect to the drafters of Islamic human rights schemes such as those 
cited infra notes 83-85.  Professor Mayer astutely notes that these documents “[e]ven while promoting Islamic 
versions of human rights, … seem to regard international human rights as the ultimate norm against which all rights 
schemes are inevitably measured and from which they fear to be caught deviating.”  MAYER, supra, at 53.
20 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right:  Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 51 (1992); Henry Steiner & Philip Alston, Comment on Types of State Duties Imposed by Human Rights 
Treaties, in  STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 180-85; James Nickel, How Human Rights Generate Duties to 
Protect and Provide, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 77 (1993); D. SELBOURNE, THE PRINCIPLE OF DUTY (1994); Ben 
Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights:  Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 565 (2001) (citing U.N. Comm'n on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the 
Commission on Global Governance, http://www.cgg.ch (1995) (a report on individual responsibilities; A Universal 
Declaration of Human Responsibilities, Inter-Action Council (Sept. 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.asiawide.or.jp/iac/UDHR/EngDecl1.htm; Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, UNESCO 
(1997), available at http://astro.temple.edu/<diff>dialogue/Antho/unesco.htm; Int'l Council of Human Duties, A 
Declaration of Human Duties: A Code of Ethics of Shared Responsibilities, http://www.univ.trieste.it/<diff>ichd 
(1997); United People's Assembly, A Declaration of Human Responsibilities, http://acgc.org/Ethics/adeclara.htm 
8In Part II, I review the scholarship discussing the development of international human rights, 
paying close attention to the newest and most controversial set of human rights norms, the so-called “third 
generation” solidarity rights.  These solidarity rights share several characteristics not common to previous 
international human rights; although most commentators focus exclusively on their “group right” 
component, I emphasize their equally important “individual duty” component.  In Part III, I show that 
although social solidarity and individual duty to the group are among the new developments in the 
international human rights movement, they have long been fundamental in Islamic law, and elaborate the 
importance of individual duties in Islamic law by examining the complexity of the language of Islamic 
duties.  In Part IV, I synthesize these previous parts, arguing that, from a reverse moderate relativist point 
of view, the move in the international human rights movement towards third generation solidarity rights 
marks a shift towards a more Islamic standard, which has traditionally placed high importance on 
individual duty to the ummah (group).  To elucidate this point, I examine the three most common third 
generation solidarity rights – the right to development, the right to a healthy environment, and the right to 
peace – finding a strong basis for each in Islamic law.  Because Islamic law emphasizes individual duty 
within group solidarity, examination of Islamic notions of these third-generation solidarity rights can help 
the human rights movement better understand the undervalued element of individual duty which is 
present in such rights alongside their “group right” element.
II. Social Solidarity:  The Newest Generation of 
International Human Rights
(June 1998); The Hart Ctr. (UK), Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, http:// 
www.hartcentre.demon.co.uk/udhr.htm (last modified Sept. 1998)); UNESCO, SYMPOSIUM ON NEW HUMAN 
RIGHTS: THE RIGHTS OF SOLIDARITY, MEXICO CITY, 1980 at 3, UNESCO Doc. 55.81/CONF.806/4 
(1981); International Council on Human Rights Policy, TAKING DUTIES SERIOUSLY: INDIVIDUAL DUTIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15–18 (1999); Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, U.N. Comm'n on 
Hum. Rts., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/63 (2000) ; UN Economic and Social Council, Decision 
2001/285 (24 July 2001); Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17; The Individual’s Duties to the Community and the 
Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms under Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, report 
of the Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2 (1982) (hereinafter “Report of SR 
Daes”).
9a. Explaining Third Generation Solidarity Rights
Human rights law has historically placed a strong emphasis on the individual, leading Professors 
Henry Steiner and Philip Alston to conclude in their authoritative text on human rights that “[o]bservers 
from different regions and cultures can agree that the human rights movement … stems principally from 
the liberal tradition of Western thought … [and n]o characteristic of the liberal tradition is more striking 
than its emphasis on the individual.”21  Amidst a historical tradition recognizing “first generation” civil 
and political rights of individuals,22 and “second generation” economic, social, and cultural rights of 
individuals,23 it is only recently that the human rights discourse has been enriched, developing a language 
of social solidarity containing individual duties alongside individual rights, an international legal
language which combines rights and duties, as opposed to its predecessors in Western political theory and 
philosophy.24
21
 STEINER & ALSTON,supra note 1, at 361-62.  
22
 The “first generation” rights were/are the civil and political rights, such as “freedom from slavery, torture, the 
right to recognition and equality before the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest and the guarantee of fair criminal 
procedures, and respect for rights of worship and expression.”  DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FRAMEWORKS 95-96 (2001).
23
 The “second generation” rights were/are the economic, social, and cultural rights, including “the right to work, to 
rest and leisure, to education, and to participation in cultural life.”  BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 96.
24
 It would be erroneous and unfair to claim that the co-existence of individual duties and rights is absent from 
Western thought altogether.  Quite the contrary, it forms a basis of Rousseau’s social contract and is also present in 
the writing of Kant, Mill, and Locke.  See, e.g., IMMANUAL KANT, THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE, in THE 
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (1797, M.J. GREGOR, TRANS., 1964); JOHN STUART MILL, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1962) 
(1961). I do not mean to argue that the synergy between individual duties and rights is absent from the Western 
social and philosophical discourse, but rather that it has not been codified in the international human rights legal
discourse as it has been in Islamic law.  Some would even dispute this claim.  Professor Philippa Strum argues, for 
example, that “the idea of individual responsibility to the community is central to rights and contract theory as 
articulated in the Western tradition, and that both responsibility and rights are implicit in the international version of 
the social-contract theory that currently illuminates international law” (emphasis added).  Philippa Strum, Rights, 
Responsibilities, and the Social Contract, in INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE 
FUTURE 29 (KENNETH W. HUNTER & TIMOTHY C. MACK, EDS., 1996) (hereinafter “RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES”).  Strum adopts, however, a theory of social contract in which the individual’s duties to the 
community are limited to civic duties such as voting and participating in the political process, a far narrower 
conception than the inter-individual duties I am discussing here.  Finally, Amitai Etzioni’s recent Communitarian 
movement, although arguing forcefully for individual responsibility to the group, does so outside the paradigm of 
international human rights law.  See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY:  RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993).
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The so-called “third-generation” human rights,25 emphasize the combined rights and duties of 
both individuals and groups.26  Originally developed by Professor Karel Vasak in the early 1980s,27 and 
recently re-examined by Carl Wellman in his excellent article on the subject,28 the definition of a third 
generation solidarity right has three distinct components.  First, they impose joint obligations among 
states, as opposed to the mere several obligations of first- and second-generation human rights.29  In other 
words, they can only be fulfilled when states and other groups work together.  Second, solidarity rights 
involve a group right that is unique from and additional to the classic individual right paradigm.30  Third, 
whereas the first- and second-generation rights impose obligations primarily upon states, third generation 
solidarity rights can “not be realized without the concerted efforts of all the actors on the social scene … 
[including] the individual.”31
Thus, third generation human rights expand both the notion of right and that of obligation, from 
the smallest social unit (the individual) to the largest group.  The notion of right is broadened to 
encompass group rights; the notion of obligation broadened to include individual obligations and joint 
obligations.  Considering this complete cooperation between individuals and groups, Wellman’s term 
“solidarity rights” is indeed appropriate.  Within this most-recent and least developed category of human 
rights, scholars typically include the right to development,32 the right to a healthy environment,33 and the 
right to peace,34 but the boundaries of third generation rights have never been fully explored.35  By 
examining Islamic notions of third generation solidarity rights, this article is one attempt in this direction.
25 See, e.g., Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:  Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 
32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 48-62 (1982).    
26
 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Articulating the Right to Domocratic Governance in Africa, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1209, 1224-27 (2003)
27 Karel Vasak, Pour une Troisième Génération des Droits de l'Homme in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 837, 839 (CHRISTOPHE 
SWINARSKI ED., 1984).
28
 Carl Wellman, Solidarity, the Individual, and Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 639 (2000).
29 Id. at 643.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 641-42.
32
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 52-56.
33
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 645-50.
34
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 56-59.
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b. Defending Third Generation Solidarity Rights
The generational paradigm of human rights in general, and the third generation of human rights in 
particular, have been criticized by several commentators, most often from the Western World,36 on 
multiple levels.37  These critiques generally fall into one of the following four themes:  that such 
generational terminology generally implies a preference for certain rights, that third-generation rights are 
unnecessary because they can already be protected by the existing generations, that third-generation rights 
are useless because they are non-justiciable, and that such aspirational rights threaten the legitimacy of 
existing human rights.38  This section will treat, and reject, each in turn.    
First, some criticize that the generational terminology generally implies a preference for some 
rights over others.  Yet, while some of these critics argue that such terminology prefers the earlier 
generations, “plac[ing] Europe at the pinnacle of global development,”39 others make the opposite claim 
that the word generation “connotes a succeeding generation replacing an older one.”40  The fact that these 
critics have not even agreed which rights the generational terminology prefers is good evidence that the 
35
 For additional treatments of third-generation solidarity rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST 
WORLD: INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES (JAN BERTING ET AL. EDS., 1990); Stephen Marks, 
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980's?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435 (1981) (suggesting other 
potential third generation rights such as the right to food, the right to benefit from or share in the common heritage 
of mankind, the right to communicate, the right to humanitarian assistance, the right to the satisfaction of basic 
needs, and the right to disarmament); Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 19 
(1986); Jack Donnelly, Third Generation Rights, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(C. BROLMANN ET AL., EDS); Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984); Douglas 
Sanders, Collective Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1991); Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an 
Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287 (1983); Dueling Fates:  Should The International Legal Regime 
Accept a Collective or Individual Paradigm to Protect Women’s Rights? 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347 (2002). 
36
 Cees Flinterman, Three Generations of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:  
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES 75, 78 (1990).
37 See, e.g., Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 
607 (1984); Otto, supra note 12, at 38 -39; Sohn, supra note 25, at 62; Wellman, supra note 28, at 649-56; 
Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79; Udombana, supra note 26, at 1226-1228; Philip Alston, A Third Generation of 
Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law? 29 NETH. INT'L 
L. REV. 307 (1982).
38
 An additional critique, raised by Cees Flinterman,   “relates to the question of general acceptance and 
meaningfulness of international human rights in a world of diverse value systems.  In this view third-generation 
rights are seen primarily as the reflection of the vagaries and pressures of current United Nations policies rather than 
of widespread and significant popular demands.”  Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79.  Because the rest of this article is 
based on the notion that third generation rights represent a move towards, not away from, non-Western value 
systems, this critique is not treated in this section.
39
 Otto, supra note 12, at 38.
40
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 62.
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generational terminology does not, in fact, prefer particular rights at all.  Rather than implying a 
preference for certain rights over others, the generational terminology represents variations in the balance 
between individual and collective rights and duties.  These variations are valuable, and I have argued that 
a full recognition of them is fundamental to the question of the universality of human rights,41 but this 
additional approach in no way effects the important role of previously established and important human 
rights.
Second, specific to third-generation rights, the critique is raised that “because the coordinated 
action of states is required, given contemporary global interdependence, to secure first-  and second-
generation human rights, … new joint obligations can be derived directly from the existing human rights 
of individual persons without the emergence of any additional rights of solidarity.”42  But, this critique 
ignores the entire legitimacy concern upon which this article is based, that because efforts to universalize 
rights based consistently in Western conceptions of the individual will lack legitimacy in many cultures 
and therefore be ineffective, there should be a concurrent dialogue examining other rights paradigms, 
such as solidarity rights.43  In the words of An-Na’im, “collective rights as a conceptual category are so 
important that the human rights movement is much more weakened by their wholesale exclusion than the 
inclusion of some of them.”44
Third, some are critical of the non-justiciable character third generation solidarity rights,45 a 
critique also frequently mounted against second-generation rights.  This argument is weak for three 
reasons.  First, proponents of third-generation rights counter that “the existence or recognition of human 
41 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
42
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 651.  See also Id. at 652-53 (“If Vasak and other advocates of solidarity rights are 
correct in asserting that the human rights of individuals cannot be fully realized in a world of global interdependence 
without the efforts of all--or at least many--actors on the social scene, then the human rights of individuals provide 
legal sources adequate to justify the imposition of obligations upon a wider range of parties under existing human 
rights law.”).
43 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
44 Id. at 16.
45
 Flinterman, supra note 36, at 79.
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rights should be considered a separate question from the means by which they are enforced.”46  Second, to 
the extent that individual duties take precedence over individual rights in the latter generations – as I will 
show is the case in Islamic notions of solidarity rights and should be the case in international notions of 
these rights – justiciability is, in fact, realistic.  Third, it should be considered by many a strength, rather 
than a weakness, that the human rights movement has realized that the “legal discourse offers, at best, 
limited and precarious tools for transformative challenge.”47  In fact, in her study on the universality of 
human rights, Professor Dianne Otto cites “resisting legal imperialism” as one of the five essential 
requirements to her transformational, post-structural approach to universality, stating that  “we must be 
careful that the discourse of rights does not silence other languages--of needs, obligations, community, 
empowerment, ethics, economic justice, and material equity.   These extralegal, local languages may have 
been what Foucault meant when he suggested we turn to the possibility of a new form of 
‘antidisciplinary’ right.”48
Fourth, and related, some argue that because third generation rights “cannot realistically be 
satisfied at present and are not readily susceptible to legal codification, … [they move] the entire human 
rights idea to the level of utopian aspiration, to which governments need to feel little present 
obligation.”49  From a positivist legal standpoint, there is little substance to the argument that new rights 
could harm the implementation of old rights, because obligations in human rights law are highly 
disaggregated, with each State’s obligations being a function of its ratifications and reservations to the 
existing human rights treaties.  Any non-binding codification of third generation rights would have no 
consequence on State obligations under the existing binding human rights treaty mechanisms, the latter 
obligations being specific and rooted in the elaboration of rights developed by the relevant treaty body.   
46 Id.  at 78.  See also An-Na’im, supra note 11, at 14 (“[T]here is a circular logic in saying that since collective 
rights cannot satisfy the exact justiciability requirements of individual rights, they cannot possibly qualify as human 
rights.”).
47
 Otto, supra note 12, at 42.
48 Id. at 43 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 108 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980)).
49 Id. at 79.  See also Sohn, supra note 25, at 62 (“It has also been said that claims for new rights distort the meaning 
of human rights ‘by pretending that all objects of human desire are 'rights' which can be had, if not for the asking 
then at least for the demanding,’ especially if one talks of such ‘rights’ as rights ‘to a happy childhood, to self-
fulfillment, to development.’”) (citing Kirkpatrick, Double Standards in Human Rights 2, 2 (Dep't of State Bureau 
of Public Affairs, U.S. Current Policy No. 353, Nov. 24, 1981)).
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The argument is also questionable from the perspective of legal history:  Human rights law specifically,50
and international law generally,51 has always been marked by a progressive codification process, 
beginning with non-binding declarations and progressing towards binding obligations when and if support 
exists in the international community.  Professor Sohn notes that “Like the economic, social, and cultural 
rights, the new rights, even if not immediately attainable, establish new goals that can be achieved 
progressively, by one laborious step after another.”52
Rather than mere utopian aspirations, third generation solidarity rights are in the words of Paul de 
Waart “the pivot on which both human rights and rights of state hinge.”53  In this regard, Flinterman notes 
that the right to development “works as a corrective to the direction of development, …concerned with 
the quality of development … [and making] individual development its ultimate goal.”54  Similarly, 
Vasak argues that general protection of the environment is useless, “if one does not start from the basic 
right [and, I might add, duty] of the individual to a clean and balanced environment.”55  Third generation 
rights, according to Vasak, “infuse the human dimension into areas where it has all too often been missing 
having been left to the State or States."56  Furthermore, their acceptance may go a long way towards 
solving the universality question in the international human rights movement.  The critiques outlined in 
this section can largely be distilled into an over-all fear that acceptance of solidarity rights will threaten 
50
 The modern international human rights movement was born with a non-binding declaration, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which was later codified as two binding Covenants, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.  See STEINER 
& ALSTON, supra note 1, at 138-41.
51
 Customary International Law is grounded in the assumption that non-binding declarations and other opinio juris 
become binding customary international law if they are consistently followed by States “out of a sense of legal 
obligation.”  BEDERMAN, supra note 22, at 14-24; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 119-126 
(2001).  See, e.g. Hurst Hannun, The Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 
(describing how the Declaration has been utilized by a number of U.S. courts as evidence of the content of 
customary international human rights law).
52
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 63-64.  See also Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance:  
The Case of Collective Rights, supra note 11, at 4 (arguing that “the recognition of collective rights as human rights 
should neither be at the expense of the protection of individual human rights, nor confined to the conceptual and 
implementation framework of these rights.”).
53
 Flinterman, supra note 36, at 77.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 78.
56
 Lecture by Karel Vasak, Tenth Study Session of the International Institute of Human Rights (July 1979), as 
quoted in Marks, supra note 35, at 441.
15
existing individual rights.  This fear should be taken for what it is – an effort to keep the human rights 
movement Western-centric – and disregarded.
c. The De-emphasized “Individual Duty” Variable in Third 
Generation Solidarity Rights
As explained above, Wellman’s three-pronged definition of third-generation solidarity rights 
emphasizes their role both as group rights (the second prong) and as individual duties (the third prong).57
Although this is the case, the prevailing western conception of these rights focuses almost exclusively on 
the “group right” component, rarely mentioning the “individual duty” component.58  This reluctance to 
acknowledge the role of individual duties in third generation human rights is consistent with a long-
standing reticence in international law to codify individual duties in international instruments.59  As 
57 Supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
58
 For a lengthy characterization of solidarity rights as “group rights,” see Koo VanderWal, Collective Human 
Rights:  A Western View, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:  INDIVIDUALS AND 
COLLECTIVITIES (hereinafter “INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES”) 83 (1990).  See also Jack Donnelly, 
Human rights, Individual Rights and collective Rights, in INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES, supra, at 39,
43-54; Peter R. Baehr, Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, in INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVITIES, supra, at 
99; Theo van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 461, 470-72 (1995).  In another 
work, my argument that affirmative action be classified as a third generation group right was, similarly, based on its 
“group right” component.  See Jason Morgan-Foster, From Hutchins Hall to Hyderabad and Beyond:  A 
Comparative Look at Affirmative Action in Three Jurisdictions, 9 Wash. & Lee R.E.A.L. J. 73 (2003) (arguing that 
“as a human right, affirmative action [is] … a positive duty on a government and it protects group rights”).  See also 
Louise Mulder, How Positive can Equality Measures Be? in NON-DISCIRIMINATION LAW:  COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 65 (Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues eds., 1999) (arguing that, by its very nature, affirmative 
action represents some willingness to acknowledge group rights no matter what the jurisdiction).  Even when An-
Na’im follows a reverse moderate relativist approach and discusses the potential universality of collective rights, he 
treats these rights almost exclusively from the “group right” and not “individual duty” perspective.  See Abdullahi 
A. An-Na’im, Human Rights and the Challenge of Relevance:  The Case of Collective Rights, supra note 11.
59
 STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 323 (noting that a “fundamental characteristic of the UDHR and ICCPR 
[is] their foundation in the rhetoric and concept of rights”).  See also UDHR, supra note 7 (completely framed as 
rights with the exception of article 29); ICCPR, supra note 7 (completely framed as rights except one pre-ambular 
reference to duties); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (hereinafter “ICESCR”) Dec. 
16, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (completely framed as rights except one pre-ambular 
reference to duties); Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (fifty references to rights and no references to duties); 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965 (entered into force Jan. 4, 
1969), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (forty-five references to rights and no references to duties); Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113 (entered into 
force June 26, 1987) (fifteen references to rights and only one reference to duties (Art. 10)); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). (seventy-six references to 
rights and three references to duties (Arts. 3, 5, 14)).  But see Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights:  Human 
Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 588-91 (arguing that “the 
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Special Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes made clear in her exhaustive, 8-year study on the individual’s duty 
to the community under Art. 29 of the UDHR (the soul duties provision of that instrument),60 the debate 
over duties in the drafting of the UDHR was long and protracted:  Although “it was emphasized that it 
was not possible to draw up a declaration of rights without proclaiming the duties implicit in the concept 
of freedom which made it possible to set up a peaceful and democratic society,”61 the numerous attempts 
to enumerate such duties could never find agreement,62 and the weak and undefined general duty of the 
individual under article 29 is all that emerged.63  The reference to duties in the pre-ambular paragraphs of 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR is the similarly insignificant result of an equally protracted debate.64
Controversy surrounding the concept of international duties has been rekindled in response to the 
international duties movement of the late 1990s,65 particularly the proposed draft Universal Declaration of 
Human Responsibilities written by the Inter-Action Council for possible adoption by the UN General 
Assembly on the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998.66  Because of 
recognition of concepts of duty in Western legal theory carries over into an express recognition of duties in 
international human rights instruments”).  Saul is incorrect, basing this broad assertion on article 29 of the UDHR 
and the mere pre-ambular references in the ICCPR and ICESCR.  Compare Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, 
at 6 (“There is quite clearly a sharp contrast between, on the one hand, the very extensive bibliographical materials 
published on the subject of human rights, the enormous conceptual advances made in this respect and the variety of 
practical actions which human rights and fundamental freedoms have already warranted, and, on the other, the lack 
of precise formal definitions concerning what duties arise for each individual under article 29, paragraph 1, of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the last paragraph of the common preamble to the International 
Covenants on Human Rights”).  Nevertheless, Saul’s overall thesis, arguing against a “superfluous and potentially 
damaging human responsibilities treaty,” Saul, supra at 617, is consistent with my argument here that there has been 
a historical reticence to codify individual duties in international instruments.
60 See Report of SR Daes, supra note 20.
61
 Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at para. 29 (cited in cited in Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12 para. 
47).
62
 SR Daes cites several proposed formulations, none of which were approved.  Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at 
paras. 11, 13, 14, 15 and 17 (cited in Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 26 fn. 22.
63
 Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12, para. 48 (There appears to have been no difficulty at the time in 
recognizing that individuals had duties/responsibilities to their social environment but, despite the various 
formulations proposed (some withdrawn, others rejected after a vote) to arrive at precise wordings in this respect, 
the Committee finally adopted - by 35 votes to none, with 6 abstentions - the generic text which now stands as 
article 29, paragraph 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”).  Article 29 states:  “Everyone has duties to 
the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”  UDHR, supra note 7, at 
Art. 29(1).
64
 Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 12, paras. 49-52 (citing Report of SR Daes, supra note 20, at paras. 48-
63).
65
 Saul, supra note 20, at 566-78.  The various declarations proposed by the Human Responsibilities Movement are 
cited supra note 20.
66
 Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 22 ¶ 112.
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the harsh criticism of the draft declaration by leading scholars, such as Theodore Van Boven,67 and 
human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International,68 the International Commission of Jurists, and 
others,69 plans to present the draft for adoption by the UN GA were tabled.70  As explained by Ben Saul in 
his article critical of the international duties movement:
The human rights movement originated in struggles against traditional forms of duty 
towards the church, feudal lords, and the monarchy. As these struggles were slowly won, 
new forms of duty and obligation arose against which the human rights movement 
continued to struggle: the exclusions, hypocrisies, and omissions in the early human 
rights movement; the emergence of ethnic nationalism; the growth of industrial economic 
dependence; and colonial and patriarchal domination. While the human rights movement 
frequently betrayed its ideals or framed its original ideals in exclusionary terms, over 
time the movement has adapted its tactics and refocused its resistance against new forms 
of oppressive duty and obligation. In doing so, human rights advocates have vigilantly 
learned to treat the language of duty and obligation with deep and well-justified 
suspicion.71
Essentially, human rights advocates are concerned that duties will be overpowering rather than 
complementary to rights, that they will be used as an alternative force for evil, rather than as an additional 
force for good.  Yet, even Saul recognizes the element of duty present in the third generation solidarity 
right to a healthy environment, noting the “individual ‘responsibility to protect and improve the 
environment’” in the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment.72  This is a step in the right direction, because it finds an acceptable place for duties not 
complementary or additional to rights, but within the definition of a specific class of rights.  By narrowing 
67 See generally Theodore Van Boven, A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities? in REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 73 
(1998).  See also Saul, supra note 20.
68 Amnesty Int'l, Muddying the Waters: The Draft "Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities" - No 
Complement to Human Rights (1998), online at http://www.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/IOR400021998 (discussed in 
Saul, supra note 20, at 604-07).
69
 Report of SR Martínez, supra note 17, at 30, fn. 52 (listing specifically Amnesty International, the Carter Centre, 
the International Commission of Jurists and the International Federation of Human Rights) (citing the annual reports 
to the Commission on Human Rights working group on the draft declaration on the right and responsibility of 
individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.UN Docs. E/CN.4/1993/64, E/CN.4/1994/81, E/CN.4/1995/93, E/CN.4/1995/93, 
E/CN.4/1996/97, E/CN.4/1997/92 and E/CN.4/1998/98).
70
 Saul, supra note 20, at 578.
71 Id. at 616.
72 Id. at 598-99 (citing the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
adopted 16 June 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev.1 at 3, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972)).
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this place for duties so significantly, the fears of Amnesty international,73 Saul,74 and Van Boven,75 will 
be kept at bay, and duties can become a useful component of, rather than a nebulous or even dangerous 
alternative to, international human rights.
Thus, rather than a wholesale replacement of human rights by human duties, or even a human 
responsibilities movement which emphasizes the need for individual duties separate and complementary 
to human rights, duties can best be incorporated into human rights law by recognizing their place in third 
generation solidarity rights.  Consequently, the de-emphasis of the role of individual duties in third 
generation solidarity rights is harmful not only for distorting the true nature of these rights, but also 
because it denies an acceptable place for duties within human rights, a place where duties do not 
overpower all rights but rather are integral to the definition of certain rights.  Reverse moderate relativism 
provides a tool to correct this de-emphasis:  By looking to Islamic law, where individual duty to the group 
is emphasized, this article will attempt to expand the international understanding of individual duty as a 
component of third-generation solidarity rights.
73 Amnesty Int'l, Muddying the Waters: The Draft "Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities" - No 
Complement to Human Rights, supra note 68.
74
 Saul, supra note 20, at 602 (“Clearly, there is a danger that codifying responsibilities may intrude arbitrarily and 
selectively into delicate codes of local human morality, disturbing organic balances that have developed over 
time.”); Id. at 607-08 ("[T]hose in power [in West-ern and non-Western contexts] have used the language of duty 
and obligation to suppress human rights" (citing position of International Council on Human Rights Policy, stated at 
Jan Bauer, Report on United Nations Commission on Human Rights 55th Session, online at 
http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/unchr99/report4.shtml#human (July 23, 1999)); Id. at 608 (“Notions of individual duty 
may be transformed by political authorities into demands for blind and uncritical patriotism.”); Id. (“The fear has 
been expressed, for example, that some Asian governments may ‘readily embrace the concept of human 
responsibilities as a substitute for the advancement of human rights,’ particularly since Malaysian Prime Minister 
Dr. Mahatir Mohammed has called for a review of the text of the UDHR” (citing Inter-Action Council, Summary 
Report of the Steering Committee Meeting on the Dissemination of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities, http://www.asia wide.or.jp/iac/Meetings/Eng98frankfurt.htm (Mar. 20-21, 1998); Joint Standing 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade, Austl. Parliament, Improving But ... ; Australia's Regional Dialogue 
on Human Rights, http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/dialog/reportinx.htm (1998)); Id. at 610 
(“European history is littered with the bodies of desperate, rebelling peasants who sought relief from, or the 
moderation of, oppressive duties.”); Id. at 613 (“The harnessing of duty for the glory of the territorially expansionist 
State was a bloody feature of European imperialism and foreign colonization, most glaringly in the British conquest 
of Africa and India. It was also an effective method of rallying patriotism: duty to God, King/Emperor, and Country 
was the ubiquitous leitmotif of First and Second World War propaganda.”) (citations omitted).
75
 Van Boven, supra note 67.
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III. Social Solidarity:  A Muslim Duty
The first Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human rights and human 
Responsibilities, Mr. Miguel Alfosno Martínez, has already begun using the technique of reverse 
moderate relativism by looking to teachings of the world’s religions to better understand the relationship 
between human rights and human responsibilities instead of limiting his research to international law.76
Unfortunately, despite the paramount importance of duties in Islam, this initial investigation by the 
Special Rapporteur was limited to “the tenets of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church.”77 This is a 
true disadvantage, because the importance of responsibility in Islam is fundamental.  As explained by 
Marcel A. Boisard :
Islam offers a unifying and integrated vision of humankind, of society, and of the world.  
In this framework, individual duties trump individual rights.  Social virtue is 
preeminently collective rather than inter-individual.  The Western notion of individual 
self-interest as the antithesis of general welfare is thus theoretically absent in Islamic 
social thought.”78
This Islamic emphasis on duties over rights is so pronounced that one scholar characterized 
Islamic law as “an endless discussion on the duties of a Muslim.”79   Consistent with Wellman’s 
definition of third-generation international human rights,80 this Islamic notion of social improvement is a 
combined effort, whereby “[i]ndividuals, communities and indeed the state, act as the instruments by 
76
 Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, Report of Mr. Miguel Alfonso Martinez, Special Rapportuer 
appointed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights to undertake the study 
requested by the Commission in its resolution 2000/63, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/107, at 19-21 (19 Mar. 2002).
77 Id. The SR “hopes, however, that in the second phase of his research he will able [sic] to examine at first hand the 
teachings of other religions and include the results of his inquiries in his final report.”  Id. at 19.  But see Id. at 17-18 
(describing the importance of duties in the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam).
78
 Marcel A. Boisard, Existe-t-il une Conception Islamique Spécifique des Droits de l’Homme ? in ISLAM & 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 131, 132-33 (Emmanuel Hirsch, ed., 1984) (« L’Islam offre une vision unicitaire et intégré 
de l’homme, de la société et du monde.  … Dans cette optique, le devoir de l’individu prime son droit.  La qualité 
sociale par excellence est collective plutôt qu’inter-individuelle.  L’antithèse traditionnelle de la philosophie 
occidentale opposant l’intérêt individuel au bien commun est donc théoriquement absente de la pensée sociale 
islamique. ») (translation by the author).  See also Id. at 132 (« l’Islam … propose … un humanisme balancé qui 
représente un équilibre entre l’individualisme libéral plus mystique qu’égoïste et le collectivisme déshumanisant 
l’individu, au profit de l’Etat devenu une fin en soi. »).
79
 RAHMAN, supra note 8, at 32.
80
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 644.
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which these ideals are translated into practice.”81 But, although Wellman’s three-pronged definition of 
third-generation solidarity rights includes both duties and rights for the individual and the group, the 
prevailing western conception of these rights focuses on the “group right” component, rarely mentioning 
the “individual duty” component.82
In Islam, by contrast, social solidarity is rooted in the importance of individual duty to the group 
(ummah), as has been clarified in several declarations on Islam and human rights.  First, the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, emphasizes individual and collective responsibility in its 
preamble and cites human duties in Articles 1 (non-discrimination), 2 (right to life), 6 (equality of the 
sexes), 8 (legal capacity), and 9 (education).83  The Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 
composed of five principles, dedicates one of them to the importance of individual duties.84  The 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights states in its preamble that “duties and obligations have 
priority over … rights”85 and concludes with an explanatory note that “[e]ach one of the Human Rights 
enunciated in this declaration carries a corresponding duty.”86  By expanding on the concept of individual 
duties in Islamic law in this Part, and then exploring Islamic conceptions of third generation solidarity 
rights in the next Part, this article aims to enrich the international understanding of individual duty as a 
component of third-generation solidarity rights using Islamic law as its guide.
a. Islamic Bases for Individual Duties
In Islamic law, individual duties are particularly prominent and immutable because of their 
religious foundation.  Dr. Adbulaziz Othman Altwaijri emphasizes that:
81
 Nanji, supra note 182, at 346.
82 See supra note II(C).
83 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Arts. 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, UN Doc: ST/HR/1/Rev.5 (Vol. II) (Aug. 5, 1990) (hereinafter “Cairo Declaration”)).
84 Rome Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, World Syposium on Human Rights in Islam (Feb. 27, 2000), 
reprinted in Altwaijri, supra note 15, at 39 (“Second Principle:  Necessity to link rights with obligations through a 
concept based on a balance between man’s functions and his needs to construct a family and society and populate 
the earth in a way that would not run counter to Allah’s Will.”).
85 Universal Islamic Declaration on Human Rights, Preamble (Paris, Sept. 19, 1981)
86 Id. at Explanatory Notes.  The importance of individual duties to the group in Islamic law has also been 
emphasized by numerous commentators.  See MAYER, supra note 14, at 59-65.
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[H]uman rights in Islam are Allah’s rights and should be observed and exercised in the 
best manner possible, in order to achieve purity of worship, total subjugation and 
obedience to the Almighty, and full compliance with His Teachings.  The Islamic concept 
of human rights thus ascends to the sublime status of an act of worship, these rights being 
in Islamic Sharia no less than religious duties.  This degree of obligation to obey the law 
(taklif) lays a heavy responsibility on the human being vis-à-vis Allah, himself, the 
community and humanity as a whole.87
This religious weight, Dr. Alwaijri argues, makes individual responsibility “the cornerstone that 
upholds Muslim society.”88  In contrast to mere constitutional or political rights schemes, individual 
duties “are not the intellectual result of a phase in the development of the human mind, nor are they 
natural rights as stipulated in organic laws.  They are, in fact, duties of the faith, entrusted to the 
individual and the society; each within their domain and depending on their degree of responsibility.”89
Similarly, Professor Fazlur Rahman of the University of Chicago argues that “[j]ust as in Kantian terms 
no ideal knowledge is possible without the regulative ideas of reason …, so in Qur’anic terms no real 
morality is possible without the regulative ideas of God and the Last Judgment.  Further, their very moral 
function requires that they exist for religiomoral experience and cannot be mere intellectual postulates to 
be ‘believed in.’”90 In fact, the sense of obligation created is so strong, that several Islamic scholars prefer 
the term “human necessities” to human rights.91  Under Islamic law, the sovereign is Allah, “the absolute 
87
 Altwaijri, supra note 15, at 15.  See also Id. at 20 (“The Development that Western civilizations witnessed 
towards the middle of the 20th century in the field of human rights had long been acquired and put into practice not 
as ‘rights’ only, but as ‘divine duties’ and lawful obligations that no human being could sidestep even if he wished 
to.  This is a new angle and a new height that constitutes a qualitative addition which enriches the Islamic 
perspective and enhances effectiveness and impact of these rights with social peace as a result.”).
88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis added).
90
 RAHMAN, supra note 8, at 14.
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 In his book, aptly titled Islam and Human Rights:  Requisite Necessities rather than Mere Rights, Dr. Muhammad 
Amara explains that “due to its belief in the … sacred nature of … rights,”  Islam considers them “’necessities,’ and 
made them part of the ‘obligations.’” MUHAMMAD AMARA, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  REQUISITE 
NECESSITIES RATHER THAN MERE RIGHTS (MIMOUN MOKHTARI, TRANS., 1996).  Drawing extensively 
on the Qur’an and Sunna, he enumerates the following human necessities:  Freedom, shura (consultation), justice, 
knowledge, involvement in public issues, and opposition.  Id. at 5.  See also Altwaijri, supra note 15, at 1920 (“If 
the Universal Declaration on [sic] Human Rights … has covered the rights of contemporary men, the Islamic 
conception of these rights goes beyond the time difference, Islam having affirmed them fourteen centuries ago and 
elevates them from a status of ‘rights’ to that of ‘necessities’ and to the level of ‘duties and obligations.’”) (citing 
Muhammad Amara, Human Rights, Social Security Fence, or Sources for its Violation?, in ISLAM AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY 83 (1998)); Joelle Entelis, International Human Rights:  Islam’s Friend or Foe? 20 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 1251, 1290 (1997) (“In Islam, rights are the equivalent of duties owed to God and to others.   Human rights, 
thus, exist only in regard to human duties, which shari'a prescribes.  Individuals may obtain rights only by meeting 
such obligations.”);  Said, Human Rights in Islamic Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS:  CULTURAL AND 
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arbiter of values,”92 and “[t]he sovereignty of the people, if the use of the word ‘sovereignty’ is at all 
appropriate, is a delegated, or executive sovereignty (sultan tanfidhi) only.”93  A full examination of the 
bases for this sense of individual obligation under Islamic law, which literally permeates the entire Qur’an
and Sunna, is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, two specific manifestations deserve special 
mention:  the doctrine of vicegerency and amanah (trust).   
The doctrine of vicegerency,94 --  variously translated as the human role as steward,95 deputy,96 or 
viceroy97 of God –  is rooted in The Holy Qur’an Heifer 3098 and significantly enhances the importance of 
human duties.  In this role as vicegerent of God, “the Muslim community is entrusted with the authority 
to implement the Shari’ah, to administer justice and to take all necessary measures in the interest of good 
government.”99  Nanji notes that “[t]he concept of custodial trusteeship, expressed in the Qur’an through 
the notion of the individual’s role as khalifah – stewardship – and hence accountability for the way in 
IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 92 (A. POLLIS & P. SCHWAB, EDS., 1980).(“[H]uman rights [in Islam] exist 
only in relation to human obligations.  Individuals possess certain obligations toward God, fellow humans, and 
nature, all of which are defined in the Shariah.  When individuals meet these obligations they acquire certain rights 
and freedoms which are again prescribed by the Shariah.  Those who do not accept these obligations have no rights, 
and any claims of freedom that they make upon society lack justicification.”) (cited in Arzt, supra note 6, at 205-06.
92 MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1991).
93 Id. (citing ADB AL-KARIM ZAYDAN, AL FARD WA’L-DAWLAH FI’L-SHARI’AH AL-ISLAMIYYAH,2ND
ED. 29 (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1970).  See also HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, 
at 57:2 (“It is He that has sovereighnty over the heavens and the earth.  He ordains life and death, and has power 
over all things.”).
94 See, e.g., Amara, supra note 91, at 64.
95
 This is the term preferred by Dr. Nanji, supra note 182, at 346.
96
 The Dawood translation of the Holy Qur’an prefers this term.  See HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 2:30.
97
 This is the word preferred by Professor Kamali, supra note 92, at 39.
98
 THE HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 2:30-31 (“Behold, the Lord said to the angels:  ‘I will create A vicegerent 
on earth.’  They said:  ‘Wilt Thou place therein one who will make Mischief therein and shed blood?  - Whilst we do 
celebrate Thy praises And glorify Thy holy (name)?’  He said:  ‘I know what ye know not.’”).  See also Id. at 6:165 
(“He has given you the earth for your heritage and exalted some of you in rank above others, so that He might prove 
you with His gifts.”); 35:39 (“It is He who has given you the earth to inherit.  He that denies Him shall bear the 
burden of his unbelief.”).  According to Jose Abraham, The word khalifa and its plurals occur nine times in the 
Qur’an.  Abraham, An Ecological Reading of the Qur’anic Understanding of Creation, BANGALORE 
THEOLOGICAL FORUM, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (2001), online at www.religion-online.org/cgi-
bin/relsearchd.dll/showarticle?item_id=1632  (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 38:26:10:14; 2:30; 
7:69:7:74; 6:165; 2:255; 7:169).
99 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 7.
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which such a role is undertaken for the betterment of society, and for future generations” exemplifies the 
importance the Qur’an places on individual duty to the group.”100
Although many contemporary Muslim thinkers, both reformist and Islamist,101 subscribe to the 
doctrine of vicegerency, including Abd-al-Hamid, Muhammad Iqbal, Mustansir Mir, George Koovackal, 
Safia Anbir, Seyyed Hossien Nasr, Al-Birnni, and Soumaya Pernilla Ouis,102 others argue that it is based 
on a misinterpretation of the term khalifah in the Qur’an 2:30.103  For these latter scholars, the doctrine of 
vicegerency would imply that Allah is not present today, an untenable position for Muslims.  In my view, 
the correct interpretation is that of the former scholars, that “[h]uman beings are vicegerents of God not in 
the sense that they succeed and replace God, [but rather] … because God subjected (sakhkhara) 
everything to us and gifted us with free will, knowledge and a bias towards doing good.”104  This general 
interpretation is preferable, because even those who discount the doctrine of vicegerency as the legal basis 
for individual duties in Islamic law cannot possibly deny the existence of such duties.  It is to other 
potential bases for individual duties that I know turn.
In addition, or in the alternative, individual duties to Allah and to the Ummah are rooted in the 
amanah (trust) which Allah has placed in each individual as described in Al-Ahzab 72-73:  “We offered 
100
 Nanji, supra note 182, at 346 (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 2:30).  See also Nanji, supra, at 353 
(“The new boundary within which such an integrated vision would operate for Muslims was in a moral community 
in which the Islamic ethical dispensation would find form.  The ummah and its leaders were the custodians of these 
values and the community was also the context in which these values could be implemented, enforced and 
institutionalized.”).
101
 After analyzing the views of reformists Muhammad ‘Adbuh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935), and Islamists 
Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), ‘Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi (d. 1981), Rashid al-Ghannushi (b. 1941) and Shaykh Ahmad 
Yasin (b. 1936) David L. Johnston argues that there is “a growing overlap between reformism and Islamism in the 
creative and constructive harnessing of [vicegerency] in the ongoing Muslim dialogue with the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”  David L. Johnston, The Human Khilafa:  A Growing Overlap of Reformism and 
Islamism on Human Rights Discourse?  28 ISLAMOCHRISTIANA 35, 52 (2002).
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 Abraham, supra note 98.  For additional contemporary supporters in the doctrine of vicegerency, see Johnston, 
supra note 101, at 48-49 n. 60 (citing MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZALI, HUQUQ AL-INSAN BAYNA TA’ALIM 
AL-ISLAM WA-I’LAN AL-UMAM AL-MUTTAHIDA 11 (1984);  MUHAMMAD FATHI UTHMAN, HUQUQ 
AL-INSAN BAYNA L-SHARI’A L’ISLAMIYYA WA-L-FIKR AL-QANUNI AL-GHARBI 62-65 (1982); 
MUHAMMAD ‘AMMARA, AL-ISLAM WA-HUQUQ AL-INSAN:  DARURAT, LA HUQUQ 140 (1989); 
MUHAMMAD AHMAD FATHI & SAMI SALAH AL-WAKIL, HUQUQ AL-INSAN FI L-FIKR AL-GHARBI 
WA-L-SHAR’ AL-ISLAMI:  DIRASA MUQARANA (1992); ‘Abd al-Sabur Marzuq, Darurat, La Huquq, in ‘ADB 
AL-NABI HASAN ‘ABD AL-WAHHAB, HUQUQ AL-INSAN WA-WAJIBATU-HU FI L-ISLAM, AL-
QADAYA AL-ISLAMIYYA 57 (2000); USAMA AL-ALFI, HUQUQ AL-INSAN WA-WAJIBATU-HU FI L-
ISLAM 15 (2000); AMAR ‘ABD AL-‘AZIZ, HUQUQ AL-INSAN FI L-ISLAM 8-11 (1997)).
103
 See The Baseless Doctrine of Vicegerency of Man, online at http://www.renaissance.com.pk/decq102y2.html.
104
 Abraham, supra note 98.
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Our trust to the heavens, to the earth, and to the mountains, but they refused the burden and were afraid to 
receive it.  Man undertook to bear it, but he has proved a sinner and a fool.”105  By accepting this trust, 
humans have accepted individual responsibility towards each other and toward the whole of society.106
The second part of the sura represents two major obstacles (sin and foolishness) to the accomplishment of 
this mission.107   This trust is also represented in Al-A’Raf 172.  After discussing the individual duty to 
“strictly observe” Islamic law,108 this sura states:  “Your Lord brought forth descendants from the loins of 
Adam’s children, and made them testify against themselves.  He said:  ‘Am I not your Lord?’  They 
replied:  ‘We bear witness that You are.’  This He did, lest you should say on the Day of Resurrection:  
‘We had no knowledge of that,’ or:  ‘Our forefathers were, indeed, idolaters;  but will You destroy us, 
their descendants, on account of what the followers of falsehood did?”109  In this Sura, the potential to 
exonerate individual duty is completely eliminated:  Not only are humans prevented, through this solemn 
vow, from claiming they were not informed of their duties by Allah, but they also cannot place the burden 
on their parents. 
Still other scholars find a basis for individual duties in Al-Isra 70:  “We have bestowed blessings 
on Adam’s children and guided them by land and sea.  We have provided them with wholesome things 
and exalted them above many of our creatures.”110  Professor Idriss Alaoui Al Abdallaoui explains that 
one of the preferred explanations for this preferred status over other creatures is the human ability to think 
and reason, finding in this a duty to use it for good.111
105
 HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 33:72-73.  See also Hadith narrated by Al Bukhari and Muslim:  “Verily, each 
one of you is a guardian (shepherd), and each guardian (shepherd) is responsible for his subjects (flock)”  (discussed 
in detail in Abbas Al Jirari, Responsibility in Islam, HASSANIAN LECTURES 141 (1996).
106 Dr. Ridwan El Sayyed, Human Rights in Contemporary Muslim Thought, paper submitted to United Nations 
Seminar “Enriching the Universality of Human Rights:  Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,”  supra note 182, at 252, 260; Ridwan Al-Sayyid, Contemporary Muslim Thought and Human Rights, 21 
ISLAMOCHRISTIANA 27, 34 (1995) (considering Amanah as “the responsibility that must be shouldered by the 
Muslim vis-à-vis himself, his society and his world”) (cited in Johnston, supra note 101, at 44).  See also Al Jirari, 
supra note 105, at 146 (arguing that “there is a relationship between ‘amaana’ (trust), responsibility and the exercise 
of authority”).
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 Al Jirari, supra note 105, at 146.
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 HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 7:169.
109 Id.  at 7:172.
110 Id.  at 17:70.
111 Idriss Alaoui Al Abdallaoui, Protection of Human Rights in Islam, HASSANIAN LECTURE 46 (1991).
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Thus, even in this brief presentation of some of the most basic themes, it is clear that the bases for 
an Islamic emphasis on individual duties in the Qur’an and Sunna is extremely rich.  Rather than debating 
where, exactly, this emphasis on duties originates, it is far more useful to acknowledge the combined 
effect of the aggregate of such justifications.  As such, it is incontestable that the notion of individual 
duties in Islamic law carries great importance.  After further examining the complexity of Islamic duties 
in the next sub-sections, Part IV will examine how this Islamic emphasis on duties changes notions of 
third generation international human rights.
b. Islamic Language of Duties
Because duties are so central to Islamic belief and practice, a language and structure of duties has 
developed in Islamic law which is far more complex than the simple references to duties seen in the 
international human rights movement.112  Islamic law is a “comprehensive social blueprint” for all actions 
of Muslims, most of which are framed as duties.113  These hukm Shari’a (commands of the lawgiver 
concerning the duties of Muslims) fall into five “well known categories of wajib (obligatory), mandub 
(recommended), haram (forbidden), makruh (abominable) and mubah (permissible).”114  The importance 
of duties in this system is unquestionable:  Islamic law determines a person’s duties in every potential 
situation using these al-ahkam al-khamsa (“five qualifications”).115  These categorical divisions are highly 
complex, the subject of many multi-volume treatises on Islamic law, most of which have never been 
translated from Arabic,116 and a full examination of this subject far exceeds the scope of this article.  
Rather than explain the complex categorization of duties in Islam, a task that should only be undertaken 
by a qualified Islamic legal scholar (‘ulm or imam), this section aims simply to emphasize the point that 
112 Ibrahim Kafi Dounmez, Muslim Scholars’ attitude Towards the Meaning of Duty, THE HASSANIAN 
LECTURES 279 (1990) (“The fact tha Islamic Jurisprudence scholars have divided the deeds of the people 
responsible into five groups proves that they have deep philosophical insights on the subjects of good and bad deeds, 
and the degrees of imposition of order and warning.”).
113
 JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM THE STRAIGHT PATH 87, 88 (1998).
114 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 321-23.
115
 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, v. II, p. 790 (B. LEWIS, CH. PELLAT & J. SCHACHT, EDS., 1983).  
116 See, e.g., AL-GAZALI, AL-MUSTASFA MIN ‘ILM AL-USUL (Beirut, 1995) (originally published 1322 of the 
Hijra).  For an in-depth explanation of the five categories of Muslim duties, see Id. at v. 1, pp. 37-38, 80-89.
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duties are important in Islamic law.  At the risk that my over-simplified summary will make the opposite 
point, I provide below several common subdivisions of the Islamic conception of individual duty, in an 
effort to show its importance and complexity in Islamic jurisprudence.
1. Wajib and Fard
One place in which the complexity of the language of duties can be seen in Islamic law is the 
distinction between wajib and fard, both of which would translate into English merely as “duty.”117
Although many Islamic scholars view wajib and fard as synonymous,118 “[t]he Hanafis have, however, 
drawn a distinction between [them].  An act is thus obligatory in the first degree, that is, fard, when the 
command to do it is conveyed in a clear and definitive text of the Qur’an or Sunnah.  But if the command 
to do something is established in a speculative (zanni) authority, such as an Ahad Hadith, the act would be 
obligatory in the second degree (Wajib).”119  This distinction is important, according to Islamic jurists, 
because disobeying a fard makes one a disbeliever, whereas one is only a transgressor if one contests the 
authority of a wajib.120 According to some, the distinction is also important because disregarding a fard 
nullifies an act, while disregarding a wajib merely weakens it.  For example, a prayer without obligatory 
bowing or prostration is void, but without recitation of al-Fatihah it is merely deficient.121
2. Ayn and Kifaya
As a point of comparison to third generation solidarity rights in international human rights law, 
the division of Islamic duties into Ayn and Kifaya is highly significant.   Ayn duties (wajib ayni or fard 
ayni) are individual duties incumbant upon all Muslims because of their religious and social significance, 
such as ritual prayer, fasting,122 fulfillment of contracts, obedience to one’s parents,123 and the duty to 
117
 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 115, at 790.
118
 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 324; AL-GAZALI, supra note 116, at v. 1, p. 80.
119 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 324 (citing salah (prayer) and hajj (pilgrimage) as fard and salat al-‘isha (three units 
of prayers to conclude the late evening prayer) and recinging the sura al-Fatihah as wajib).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122
 ENCLYOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 115, at 790.
123 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 325.
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understand certain religious rules.124 Kifaya duties, on the other hand, are collective duties, “the 
fulfillment of which by a sufficient number of individuals excuses the other individuals [of the ummah] 
from fulfilling” them.125  Examples of fard kifaya include funeral prayer, jihad (holy struggle), hisbah 
(the promotion of good and prevention of evil), giving testimony and serving as a judge, building 
hospitals, extinguishing fires,126 and acquiring Ilm al-Deen (full religious knowledge).127  Because not 
everyone is capable of acquiring full knowledge of Islam, and not everyone has the means to meet the 
cost of a burial when someone dies or to build a hospital, these duties are kifaya (collective).  But, for 
those who have the means, the collective obligation becomes their personal obligation – the fard kifaya 
becomes fard ayn.128
3. Muwaqqat and Mutlaq
Islam also divides duty into muwaqqat (contingent on a time limit) and mutlaq (absolute, that is, 
free of time limit).129  Examples of the former include fasting and obligatory prayers, because there is a 
specific time in which they are to be performed.  On the other hand, the hajj pilgrimage is an example of a 
mutlaq duty, since it can be performed at any time during one’s life.  Payment of kaffarah (expiation) also 
fits into this latter category.  Other mutlaq duties are absolute in the sense that, every time the relevant 
124 Shahid Bin Waheed, Was 9/11 prophesized in Islam?, online at http://www.geocities.com/J_1975X/9-11.htm
(discussing the fard ayn duties to acquire knowledge of the rules of Islam in areas such as rules of Tahaarah (purity) 
and Najaasah (impurity); Salah (Prayers); Sawm  (fasting); all duties which are fard or Wajib; all things declared 
haraam (prohibited) or Makruh (reprehensible or repugnant); the laws of Zakaah (almsgiving) on the part of one 
who owns property or wealth above the fixed Nisaab (threshold); the rulings and injunctions on Hajj; the rulings and 
injunctions of sale and lease (Ba’i and Ijaarah) on the part of one who has to buy and sell or run a business or 
industry or work on wages or salary; and the laws of Nikah (marriage) and Talaaq (divorce)).
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 ENCLYOPEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 115, at 790.
126
 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 325.
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 Waheed, supra note 124 (citing the duty “[t]o understand the meanings and rulings of the entire Qur’aan, [t]o 
understand all Ahadeeth and to master the ability to sift and recognize the trustworthy from the untrustworthy, [and 
t]o acquire a complete knowledge of all injunctions and rulings deduced from the Glorious Qur’aan, and Sunnah 
with a full awareness of the views of the Shariah, the Tabi’in and Mujtahid Imaams, expressed by them orally or 
practically.”).
128 See KAMALI, supra note 92, at 325 (“jihad, … is as wajib kafa’I, although when the enemy attacks and besieges 
a locality it becomes the personal duty of every resident to defend it.  Similarly, when there is only one mujtahid in a 
city, it becomes his personal duty to carry out itjtihad.”); Interview with Professor Ahmed Abbadi, Professor of 
Islamic Law (Feb. 5, 2004) (“If you are skilled to become a physician, it is fard ayn for you.  If not, it is fard ayn to 
oblige those who are skilled to do it, by convincing them and helping them.  In this way, every fard is kifaya with 
ayn inside of it based on the faculties of the person.”).
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 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 325; AL-GAZALI, supra note 116, at v. 1, pp. 83-84; Dounmez, supra note 112, at 
280.
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occasion arrises, the duty must be fulfilled, such as the duty to obey one’s parents and to carry out hisbah 
(promoting good and preventing evil).130
4. Muhaddad and Ghayr Muhaddad
Finally, there is also a division in Islamic law between muhaddad (quantified) duties and ghayr 
muhaddad (unquantified) duties.131  The former include zakah, salah, payment by the purchaser in a sales 
transaction, payment of a specific rent in a tenancy agreement, and payment of hudud (penalties), all of 
which are quantified and specific.132  Unquantified duties, on the other hand, include the duty to “give 
charity to the needy not in time of zakat, to feed the hungry not in time of feeding, when the person 
responsible has to do penance, to do justice, benovelence [sic] and economy in expending, abstinence, to 
help the sorrowful and the grieved, and all similar duties to which the legislator has not fixed a 
determined value because they are meant to meet the needs of the people.”133  Because ghayr muhaddad 
duties are unquantified specifically because they are meant to meet social demand, they exemplify 
particularly well the social solidarity goal inherent in Islamic duties.  Although in a more subtle way, even 
muhaddad duties have a strong social solidarity component, because they are embedded with ghayr 
muhaddad duties, as determined by the capacity of the individual.  For example, “the school master, the 
university teacher, after they have finished their duties and works required from them in exchange for a 
salary, … should provide scientific and intellectual assistance to whoesoever [sic] is in need of it. … 
within the limits of their possibilities.”134  Similarly, a wealthy Muslim upon paying zakat (a determined 
duty), must then evaluate his or her means combined with the needs of those around to determine if 
130
 KAMALI, supra note 92, at 325-26.
131 Id.  at 326 ; Dounmez, supra note 112, at 280-81.
132 Id.
133
 Dounmez, supra note 112, at 281 (emphasis added).  See also KAMALI, supra note 92, at 326 (citing also “the 
duty to support one’s close relatives, … paying a dower (mahr) to one’s wife, the length of standing (qiwam), 
bowing and prostration in salah, wiping the head in ablution (wudu) and quantifying the ta’zir penalties for offences 
which are punishable but in regard to which the Lawgiver has not quantified the punishment.”).
134 Dounmez, supra note 112, at 283-84.
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additional material help is required (an undetermined duty).135  In this way, the end result of both 
muhaddad and ghayr muhaddad duties is meeting social need to the highest extent possible.
c. Additional Aspects of Duties in Islam
In several other ways, the discourse surrounding duties in Islam is complex.  First, Islam has 
recognized the distinction between positive and negative duties,136 much as the human rights movement 
recognizes the distinction between positive and negative rights.137  Second, just as human rights scholars 
analyze conflicts between two rights, noting that one individual’s right only extends as far as the 
encroachment of the rights of another individual,138 Islam carries out the same analysis in the context of 
duties.  Using the example of a society in need of 10,000 doctors which has 30,000 doctors, Dounmez 
argues that a society where too many people are meeting a fard kifaya (collective duty) has done no better 
in meeting the collective duty than a society where too few are meeting the duty.  Analyzing the issue “in 
light of the aim of the collective duty,” Dounmez concludes that “the collective duty is not realized, 
[because] … the limit expected is surpassed on account of another collective duty.”139  Thus, just as 
human rights scholars limit an individual right partly based on its potential to encroach other rights of 
other individuals, Islamic legal scholars limit duties based on their potential to encroach upon other 
individual duties to society.  The notable difference is in the effect:  whereas the focus in the human rights 
analysis resolves a conflict of one individual against another, the Islamic duties analysis attempts to 
maximize two simultaneous attempts at societal improvement.
135 Id.
136 Dounmez, supra note 112, at 282 (“Duties in Islam are not confined to the performance of certain specific 
behaviours.  There are duties which are a sort of giving up certain specific, behaviour, even if the basic principle of 
duty is obligation.”).
137 J STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at 363.
138
 For example, a potential conflict exists between one person’s freedom of speech and another person’s right to 
individual dignity, if the content of the speech is harmful to the ideas, beliefs or identity of the second person.
139 Dounmez, supra note 112, at 286.
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d. Conclusion
Thus, Islamic law is characterized by a pronounced emphasis on duties over rights, which now 
forms part of a complex language, theology, philosophy, and law of duties.  Beginning with a discussion 
of several religious bases for the emphasis on individual duty, this Part has outlined several of the ways 
Islamic thinkers have divided the concept of duty.  Any effort at brief summary of this vast world of 
duties, which has intrigued Islamic scholars for over a millennium, would be ipso facto deficient, but a 
notion of the importance of duties in Islamic law is critical to the greater goal of this article, analysis of 
Islamic notions of third generation solidarity rights.  By providing an overview of four ways that duty in 
Islamic law is commonly divided, this section has aimed not to fully examine these divisions, but rather to 
argue that the mere presence of such divisions speaks to the importance of duties in the Islamic tradition.  
This Part concluded by discussing other areas where duties language in Islam is highly developed, 
paralleling rights language in international human rights law.  Having established the paramount 
importance of individual duties in Islamic law, the next Part will examine its effect on Islamic notions of 
third generation solidarity rights.
IV. Third Generation International Human Rights:  An 
Islamic Perspective
At least a decade before Vasak made his famous “discovery” of third-generation human rights, a 
group of eminent jurists from Saudi Arabia described the concept in almost identical terms in their efforts 
to explain Islamic conceptions of human rights at The Vatican Colloquium on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights in Islam.140   In their concluding observations, they stated:
 “We note that cultural rights as codified in the international conventions are personal and 
subjective rights, not general and imperative duties. We further note that these rights are 
framed in ‘negative’ terms only. … [In contrast,] cultural rights in Islam have an 
140 COLLOQUES DE RIYAD, DE PARIS. DU VATICAN, DE GENEVE ET DE STRASBOURG SUR LE 
DOGME MUSULMAN ET LES DROITS DE L’HOMME EN ISLAM :  ENTRE JURISTES DE L’ARABIE 
SAOUDITE ET EMMINENTS JURISTES ET ENTELLECTUELS EUROPEENS 109, 132-34 (Dar Al-Kitab 
Allubnani, Beyrouth, undated) (hereinafter « COLLOQUES »).
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obligatory character that cannot be renounced, contrary to the international conception 
which considers them as a personal and discretionary right which can be renounced by 
the beneficiary.  They are both individual and collective obligations, the execution of 
which is incumbent on both the individual and the collectivity.”141
Although made in the context of economic, social and cultural rights, what these comments really 
describe are third generation solidarity rights in Islam, with an emphasis on the sharing of individual and 
collective duty.  Whereas third generation solidarity rights are weak and aspirational in the international 
legal discourse, these Saudi jurists cite them as a basic principle in the Islamic notion of human rights, 
discussing them prior to their “discovery” by the international human rights movement.  Just as Wellman 
expounds three decades later, these scholars emphasized the importance of coexisting individual and 
collective obligations that is characteristic of third generation solidarity rights.  Because of these parallels 
between the conceptions of Islam and the foundations of solidarity rights, it should come as no surprise 
that strong support exists for the three most-commonly proposed solidarity rights – the right to a healthy 
environment, the right to development, and the right to peace – in the Islamic tradition.  This Part will 
examine each area in detail.    
a. Right to a Healthy Environment
As discussed by Wellman,142 a growing number of international conventions in the past twenty 
years have attempted to codify a right to a healthy environment, such as the Stockholm Declaration on the 
Human Environment in 1972,143 the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981,144 the United 
Nations World Charter for Nature in 1982,145 and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
141 Id (emphasis added).
142
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 646-48.
143 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted 16 June 1972, at 
¶1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev.1 at 3, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) (“Man has the fundamental right to … 
life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being.”).
144 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 24, adopted 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 
5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“All peoples have the right to a general 
satisfactory environment favorable to their development.”).
145 World Charter for Nature, adopted 28 Oct. 1982, G.A. Res. 37/7 (Annex) U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, 
at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982), reprinted in  22 I.L.M. 455 (1983).
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Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988.146  Against these recent 
developments on the international level, a right and duty towards environmental protection have existed 
in Islam since the time of the Prophet Mohammed,147 present in both the Qur’an and the Sunna.  This 
section will analyze some of the bases for environmental protection in Islam.
The environment is discussed in numerous verses of the Qur’an,148 a common characteristic of 
these being the view that “the concept of the environment is broad and is used in many different ways,”149
including the natural environment,150 the social environment,151 and the economic environment.152  The 
Qur’an states generally:  “Seek not (occasions for) mischief in the land.”153  This general notion of 
environmental protection manifests itself in several specific areas.  First, in the area of pollution, the 
Prophet Mohammed stated “[n]o one shall urinate on stagnant water, [and] avoid the abhorrent act of 
146 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), art. 11, opened for signature 17 Nov. 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 28 
I.L.M. 161 (1989) ("[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment.”).
147
 In every reference regarding the Prophet Muhammad, I ask that God’s peace and blessings be upon him.
148
 HOLY QUR’AN as cited in Dr. Amina Muhammad Nasir, Islam and the Protection of the Environment, 13 
ISLAM TODAY 67 (1995), at Heifer: 29 (“It is He who hath created for you all things that are on earth.”); Qâf: 6-7 
(“Do they not look at the sky above them?  How we have made it and adorned it, and there are no flaws in it?  And 
the earth - We have spread it out, and set thereon mountains standing firm, and produced therein every kind of 
beautiful growth.”); The Family of ‘Imran:  191 (“And contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the 
earth, (with the thought):  ‘Our Lord! Not for naught hast Thou created (all) this!”); The poets: 7 (“Do they not look 
at the earth, - how many noble things of all kinds We have producted therein?”); The Overwhelming Event:  17-20 
(“Do they not look at the camels, how they are made?  And at the sky, how it is raised high?  And at the Mountains, 
how they are fixed firm?  And at the earth, how it is spread out?”; The Heights: 54 (“…the sun, the moon, and the 
stars, (all) governed by laws under His Command”); The ants: 61 (“Or, who has made the earth firm to live in; made 
Rivers in its midst; set thereon mountains immovable; and made a separating bar between the two bodies of flowing 
water?  (can there be another) god besides God? Nay, most of them know not.”); Pilgrimage: 65 (“He withholds the 
sky from falling on the earth except by His leave;  For God is most kind and most merciful to man.”).  All Qur’anic 
verses in this footnote are as cited in Dr. Amina Muhammad Nasir, Islam and the Protection of the Environment, 13 
ISLAM TODAY 67 (1995).
149
 Nasir, supra note 148, at 68.
150 Id. at 87-96.
151 See, e.g., Id. at 84-85; Nanji, supra note 182, at 355  (“One’s environment thus affords an opportunity … to 
improve the quality of life, to foster community values and to use human creativity to sustain the beauty as well as 
the vitality of the natural and built environment.”).
152 Id. at 83 (“Rightly guiding production and investment in accordance with the needs and interests of society is one 
of the important questions which have concerned the jurists in their researches.”) (citing SHEIKH ALI AL-
KHALIF, OWNERSHIP IN ISLAMIC SHARIA AS COMPARED WITH POSITIVE LAWS 67-69).
153
 HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6 (cited in Mohamed Haitham Al-Khayyat, On the Preservation of the 
Environment:  An Islamic Perspective, THE HASSANIAN LECTURES 152, 162 (1998)).  See also Mohammed 
Taha Sabounji, Islam and the Environment, THE HASSANIAN LECTURES 68, 73 (1991) (“Doing harm is
forbidden in Islam.  It is therefore forbidden to harm life as it is forbidden to harm its foundations.  Hence, causing 
damage to the environment is detrimental to life in general and is considered … an infringement on the beauty of the 
environment created by Allah.”).
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emptying your bowels near water sources, in the middle of the road, and in the shade.”154  Al-Khayyat 
notes that “[w]hat is striking in these commands is the use of the word ‘la’n’ (curse) or one of its 
derivatives.  ‘La’n’ entails exclusion, repudiation, and banishment from the community.  The implications 
are evident:  he who deliberately pollutes the environment to the detriment of the community becomes 
liable to banishment.”155  The use of such strong language reinforces the importance of environmentalism 
in the Islamic tradition.156    Second, Islam takes a definite stand in the area of water conservation.  The 
Prophet Mohammed forbid excessive use of water, even for cleaning or ablutions, setting the example 
himself by bathing in a ‘sa’’ (two liters) of water and performing ablutions with half a liter.157  According 
to Imam Ab ‘Ubeid in his Kitab at-Tuhur, the Prophet also returned unused clean water to the river after 
ablutions, stating “Let (this water) reach a human, an animal, or any living creature so that they may, by 
the Grace of Allah, benefit from it.”158 The Qur’an also states:  “Waste not through excess, for God does 
not love the wasteful.”159 Third, Islam takes a stand on preservation of other natural resources, such as 
plants and animals.  Imam Muhammad bin Hazm stated in his al-Muhallak: “beneficence to animals is an 
act of righteousness and piety.  Any failure to assure and assist in their well-being is tantamount to sin 
and offense.”160 The Prophet reportedly stated “He that unduly cuts down a tree shall be directed to 
hell.”161  Similarly, he established the first environmental sanctuary, an area extending to twelve miles 
around Madinah:  he restricted fishing in some areas, restricted logging within twelve miles of Madinah, 
154
 Al-Khayyat, supra note 153, at 165.
155 Id.
156 It is also worth noting the importance of personal cleanliness in Islam, which cannot be understated. Muslim and 
Al- Tirmidhi relate a hadith of the Prophet on the authority of Abu Malik al-Ash’ari stating “The Prophet, Peace and 
Blessing be upon Him, said ‘Cleanliness is half of faith.’”  Nasir, supra note 148, at 100.  Nasir emphasizes that
“Islam links faith and belief (iman) to cleanliness.  Some of the pillars of Islam, such as prayer (salat) and the 
pilgrimage (Hajj) can only be performed in a state of purity and washing in pure, clean water, free of any 
contamination.  This article of faith and others teach us to protect sources of water from pollution and to keep them 
clean.”  Id.  at 99-100.
157 Id. at 165-66.
158 Id. at 166.
159
 HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at  6:141 (cited in Nanji, supra note 182, at 356).  See also Sabounji, supra note 
153, at 73-74.
160
 Al-Khayyat, supra note 153, at 166.
161 Id.  See also Sabounji, supra note 153, at 73 (noting that the Prophet Mohammed “forbade the cutting of trees for 
no purpose or burning of enemy trees.  Islam prohibits the disfigurement of nature.  It calls for its cleanliness and 
vigour.”).
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and restricted hunting within four miles.162 Al-Khayyat notes “some Ulemas (scholars) see in such 
interdictions a keen desire to preserve the environment.  Such an awareness soon became deeply 
engrained in the minds of Muslims.”163  Fourth, Islam rewards efforts to rekindle the natural environment.  
In a hadith on the authority of Anas b. Malik, The Prophet Mohammed states “Every Muslim who plants 
a tree or plants a crop from which birds, people or animals eat shall have a reward for a beneficient 
act.”164
The importance of balance and equilibrium are also stressed.165  Environmental care “stands on 
the basis of faith … [and] any kind of corruption whatsoever – whether in the natural or social 
environment – is considered a violation of God’s law.”166  Because the duty to protect the environment is 
rooted in Divine orders, it easily exceeds duties present in third-generation human rights, which are at 
best intangible, at worst unknown to laypeople.  Environmentalism in Islam is firmly rooted in the human 
role as vicegerent,167 and the responsibility God placed in humans in the form of amanah (trust).168 In his 
paper submitted to the United Nations Conference on Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Dr. Nanji notes that “[t]he role of stewardship entrusted to human beings also 
necessitates an ethical stance towards the development of natural resources and the public space inhabited 
by human beings.169  This stewardship, thus defined, is both a right and a duty to perpetuate these gifts of 
162
 Al-Khayyat, supra note 153, at 166.
163 Id.
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 In the collections of Al-Bukhari, Muslim, and Al-Tirmidhi, as cited in Nasir, supra note 148, at 96.
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in Nanji, supra note 182, at 355);  The Moon 49: “Verily, all things have We created in proportion and measure” (as 
cited in Nasir, supra note 148, at 76).
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 Nasir, supra note 148, at 73.  See also Id. at 105 (“[P]rotection of the environment does not have its rationale in 
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 Nasir, supra note 148, at 82 (noting that under Shari’a, the right of ownership is not absolute, but “is portrayed as 
a kind of vicegerency form the True Owner – God.  Thus, man should respect, in the use of this right, the purpose 
and wisdom for which God made him a vicegerent of His Property.  Jurists consider an individual’s possession of 
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of vicegerency, see supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 105-111 and accompanying text.
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 Nanji, supra note 182, at 355 (citing HOLY QUR’AN 10:14:  “We have made you heirs in the land after them, to 
see how you will behave”).
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Allah.170 The role of humans as vicegerents profoundly affects the meaning of exploitation of natural 
resources, when it occurs.  In the capitalist model based on self-interested individuals, “exploitation” 
carries the negative connotation of using the environment for individual self-benefit.  In the Islamic model 
based on vicegerency, exploitation carries the positive connotation of a trusteeship with God meant to 
benefit the group.  Thus, Dr. Nasir notes that “in the Shari’a, ownership is a social responsibility, a fact 
which confirms the relationship between community and land, and the extent of Islam’s interest in 
regulating it.”171  Similarly, Jose Abraham notes that although some scholars translate the Arabic word 
“Sakhkhara” in Qur’anic ayat on the environment172 to mean “subjection,” “subservience,” or 
“exploitation,” “the relationship between human and non-human is not of domination or exploitation but 
that of the trust (amanah) placed with human beings by God,” making any attempt at human domination a 
“mockery to Allah.”173  Thus, through both the doctrine of vicegerency and the amanah (trust) placed in 
humans by God, exploitation becomes a divinely-motivated duty of group improvement, not a self-
motivated form of destruction.  
b. The Right to Development
The “right to development,” first articulated by Senegalese jurist Keba M’Baye in 1972,174 was 
codified in 1986 in the non-binding United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development.175  Since 
170 See, e.g., Sabounji, supra note 153, at 73 (“[T]he care, preservation, improvement and beautification of the 
environment is part … of man’s great responsibility as Allah’s viceroy on earth.”).
171
 Nasir, supra note 148, at 82. 
172 See, e.g., HOLY QUR’AN supra note 6, at 14:32-34; 16:5-8; 45:12-13.
173
 Abraham, supra note 98 (citing Abd-al-Hamid, Exploring the Islamic Environmental Ethics, in ISLAM AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 47-48 (A. R. AGWAN, ED., Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1997)).
174
 Ved P. Nanda, The Right to Development: An Appraisal, in WORLD DEBT AND THE HUMAN CONDITION:  
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 41, 43 (Ved P. Nanda et al., eds., 1993) 
(citing Keba M’Baye, Le droit au Developpement Comme Un Droit de l’Homme, 5 REVUE DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME 505 (1972)).  Nanda’s article provides a detailed account of the history of the right to development, 
challenges facing the right to development, and its evolution as an international legal norm.  See also James C.N. 
Paul, Symposium:  The United Nations Family:  Challenges of Law and Development:  The United Nations and the 
Creation of an International Law of Development, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 312 (1995); Mohammed Bejaoui, The 
Right to Development, INTERNATIONAL LAW:  ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS (1991), at 1182; Jack 
Donnelly, In Search of the Unicorn:  The Jurisprudence and politics of the Right to Development, 15 CALIF. 
WESTERN INT. L.J. 473 (1985).
175 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Resolution 41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). 
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the Declaration on the Right to Development, it has become increasingly common to embody 
development norms in international legal instruments,176 and the Secretary General of the United Nations 
has created a list of 81 international instruments codifying a commitment to social development.177  Like 
the right to peace and the right to a healthy environment, the right to development meets all three of 
Wellman’s requirements for a “third generation” solidarity right in international law:  It imposes joint 
obligations,178 it imposes duties on both states and individuals,179 and is a group right, in addition to being 
an individual one.180
Like the right to a healthy environment, there is solid evidence that the notion of the right to 
development has existed in Islamic law since the revealed texts.  The emphasis on socioeconomic justice 
and human egalitarianism is, in fact, so strong in Islam that Professor Fazlur Rahman identifies it as “[t]he 
basic élan of the Qur’an.”181 Dr. Azim Nanji notes that “The Qur’an is explicit in stating that human 
conduct and aspirations have relevance as acts of faith within the wider human, social and cultural 
context.”182  For example, the Holy Qur’an states that “[t]he righteous are those who … give from what 
176
 Paul, supra note 174, at 307.  See also SIGRUN SKOGLY, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE 
WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 141-43 (2001) (describing the work of three 
successive UN working groups on the right to development established since 1986).
177 UNITED NATIONS, PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT, REVIEW OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS RELEVANTTO POVERTY, 
EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION; OUTCOME OF THE WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT: DRAFT DECLARATION AND DRAFT PROGRAMME OF ACTION, REVIEW OF 
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS RELEVANT TO POVERTY, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL 
INTEGRATION, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.166/PC/16 at ¶ 259 (1994) See also Paul, supra note 174, at 307 (noting that 
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decades”).
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they have, to:  relatives, orphans, those in need, the ones away from home, those who ask, and in order to 
free the enslaved.”183
Parallel to the international conception of third generation solidarity rights, Professor Belkhoja 
argues that the right to development under Islamic law is based in both individual and collective 
responsibility:  “Individuals are definitely responsible for the achievement of development for the 
individual has been mandated to discharge the amanah [trust] entrusted to him by Almighty Allah. … 
Likewise, society is equally responsible because it is required to establish cooperation and solidarity. … 
The role of the State is far more extensive because it … must shoulder the burdens which cannot be borne 
by the individuals in view of their limited resources.”184  This wording parallels the international 
conception almost to the letter:  “All human beings have a responsibility for development, individually 
and collectively, [but] States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international 
conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development.”185
Yet, although one may conclude from this language that the balance of obligations in the right to 
development is similar in its international law and Islamic law formulations, the element of individual 
duty is in fact significantly stronger in Islamic law, because the tie between the individual and the group 
is stronger.186  For example, the Declaration on the Right to Development is almost completely worded in 
terms of state duties, with only one clear reference to individual obligations.187  Comparatively, the role of 
individual duty in the Islamic conception of the right to development is enormous, as evidenced in 
practices such as Zakat (almsgiving), one of the five pillars of Islam.188  This increased individual duty 
183
 HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 2 :177 (cited in Nanji, supra note 182, at 345).
184
 Muhammad Al-Habib Belkhoja, Man in Islam is the Alpha and Omega of Global Development, THE 
HASSANIAN LECTURES 188, 199-200 (1995) (citing the following two Hadith:  “If any one of you has food in 
excess, let him give the excess food to the one who has none;” and “If the Final Hour comes and finds one of you 
holding a palm shoot in his hand, if he can plant it before the onset of the Hour, let him plant it and he will earn a 
reward for that.” ).
185
 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 175, at Art. 2.1, 3.1.
186
 As stated by Sheikh Muhammad Abduh:  “Solidarity of the Ummah means that your wealth is the wealth of the 
Ummah you belong to.”  Dr. Mohammad Ammara, The Vicegerency of Man, 13 ISLAM TODAY 59, 62 (1995).
187
 Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 175, at Art. 2.1.
188
 Morgan-Foster, supra note 12, at Part IV(B)(1); KAMALI, supra note 92, at 217 (“The Qur’an often indicates 
the rationale of its laws either explicitly or by reference to its objectives.  … [T]he rationale of zakah is to prevent 
the concentration of wealth in a few hands, which is clearly stated in the Qur’an (al-Hashr, 59:7).”); Timur Kuran, 
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can be traced to two important characteristics of Islamic law.  First, just as explained supra in the context 
of the right to a healthy environment,189 Professor Muhammad Al-Habib Belkhoja attributes this 
individual duty to further the right to development in the human role as vicergerent.190   Professor 
Ammara agrees, arguing that the Qur’an explicitly supports the right to development based in the concept 
of vicegerency in Ascent 24-25.191 He notes that, as a vicegerent of God, each Muslim individual assumes 
a duty to the development of others, as is clear in the Qur’anic verse Iron 7 tying vicegerency (“heirs”) 
with almsgiving:  “Spend in Charity out of the substance whereof he has made you Heirs.”192
Second, this increased importance of individual duty can also be attributed to the spiritual nature 
of Islamic law, which facilitates a level of solidarity beyond that present in international law. 193  For 
example, the Hadith “Whoever sleeps satiated whilst his neighbour is hungry does not belong to our 
community,”194 elevates the individual duty to contribute to the group right to development so high, that 
failure results in banishment from the community itself.  The brief reference to individual duty in the UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development pales by comparison.  But, banishment from the community 
(ummah) would not be conceivable if the community were not strong or even coherent, often the case in 
the international community.  In Islam, by contrast, the community is coherent, defined, and spiritually 
relevant:  it is the community of believers in Islam itself.  Thus, it is the spiritual basis of Islamic law that 
The Provision of Public Goods under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System, 35 LAW 
& SOC'Y REV. 841 (2001) (“[A]t least a dozen Qur'anic passages have been interpreted as instructing believers to 
establish foundations serving religious or charitable purposes.”).
189 See supra note 169.
190
 Belkhoja, supra note 184, at 197.  Belkhoja explains that the human role as khalifa carries several complex and 
interrelated duties, including “the exertion of efforts in order to spread peace, achieve people’s prosperity and 
establish peaceful coexistence.”  Id.  See also Id. at 192 (“Almighty Allah selected man, elevated his status and 
entrusted him with the amanah (trust) which could not be assumed neither by the skies nor by the earth or the 
mountains.  They all declined to bear that heavy burden whereas man accepted it.  Man is therefore apt to become 
Allah’s vicergerent on the earth and to shoulder the responsibilities assigned to him by Allah.”).
191
 Ammara, supra note 186, at 62 (citing HOLY QUR’AN Ascent 24-25:  “And those in whose wealth is a 
recognized right for the (needy) who asks and him who is prevented (for some reason from asking.”)).
192 Id. at 62.
193
 Belkhoja, supra note 184, at 198 (citing Hadith:  “Work for your life on earth as if you are living eternally, and 
work for your Hereafter as if you are going to die tomorrow.”).
194 Id.
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both creates a solid ummah and helps to solidify individual duties towards that ummah.195   With this 
strong ummah, the principle of vicegerency can have meaning in the context of the right to development.
c. Right to Peace
Of the three most common third generation solidarity rights, the right to peace is the least defined 
and developed in international human rights law.196  Although the preservation of peace is a primary 
purpose of the United Nations, and figures prominently in the UN Charter, the international community 
did not begin framing peace as a third generation solidarity right until several decades later.197  First, the
UN Human Rights Commission framed it as a right in a controversial 1976 resolution.198  In 1978, it was 
codified as an individual and collective right by the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Preparation 
of Societies for Life in Peace.199  The 1984 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace further codified 
the right.200  Although the right has been recognized in international law, its contours are still vague,201
and the above efforts met with harsh protest from several Western powers who argued that general 
promotion of peace should be left to other branches of the UN, particularly the Security Council, not 
added to the list of more-established, classic human rights.202
In Islam, the omnipresence of the concept of peace cannot be understated.  It is present in the 
salutation exchanged between Muslims at each meeting.  A prayer for peace is repeated twice at the end 
195 Id.  at 195 (“Muslim scholars do not view poverty as mere destitution but rather as a major stumbling block in the 
way of worship of Allah, which obstructs the achievement of spiritual development.”).
196
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 648-49.
197 Id. at 648 (citing Charter of the United Nations, 1332 U.N.T.S. 261, Preamble  (signed 26 June 1945; entered into 
force 24 Oct. 1945) (hereinafter “UN Charter”) (“We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small. . . .”)).
198
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 57 (citing U.N. Commission on Human Rights Res. 5(XXXII), 60 U.N. ESCOR Supp. 
(No. 3) at 62, U.N. Doc. E/5768 [E/CN.4/1213] (1976) ("everyone has the right to live in conditions of international 
peace and security and fully to enjoy economic, social and cultural rights and civil and political rights.")).
199
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 649 (citing Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, adopted 15 
Dec. 1978, G.A. Res. 33/73, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/33/73 (1978) (“Every nation 
and every human being . . . has the inherent right to life in peace.”)).
200 Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, adopted 12 Nov. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/11, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 
57th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/11 (1984), available on gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00//ga/recs/39/11 (citied in 
Wellman, supra note 28, at 649).
201
 Wellman, supra note 28, at 649.
202
 Sohn, supra note 25, at 57-58.
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of each of Muslims’ five daily prayers.203 The very word “Islam” shares its root with the word for “Peace” 
in Arabic.204  Peace is one of the ninety-nine attributes of Allah.205 There are over one hundred Qur’anic 
verses discussing the importance of peace.206  Indeed, this ever-presence of Peace in Islam led Prefessor 
Mohammed Yessef to state “[t]he alpha and omega of Islam is peace.”207  Professor Yessef finds an 
individual responsibility to promote peace in the following Hadith, narrated by Imam Muslim in his 
Sahih:  “You shall not enter Paradise until you believe (in Allah), and you shall not believe (in Allah) 
until you love one another; shall I tell you something which, if you were to do it, you would love one 
another?  Disseminate (and disclose) peace among yourselves.”208  Thus, this Hadith elevates the 
dissemination of peace to a condition precedent to belief in Allah, one of the five Pillars of Islam.  
Because the five pillars of Islam represent “the core and common denominator, the five essential and 
obligatory practices all Muslims accept and follow,”209 it would be literally impossible for Imam Muslim 
to create a stronger statement regarding the duty to disseminate and disclose peace than to make one of 
these five pillars dependent on it.  Peace was also made a condition precedent to faith itself in the Hadith 
by Al-Bukhari, Muslim, and Ibn Hanbal:  “The Prophet (Peace be upon Him), says ‘You only have faith 
when you desire for your brother what you desire for yourself.’”210
203
 ESPOSITO, supra note 113, at 89 (“At the end of [each of five daily] prayer[s], the shahada is again recited, and 
the “peace greeting” – “Peace be upon all of you and the mercy and blessings of God” – is repeated twice.”).
204
 Idris Alaoui Abdallaoui, The Bases of Neighbourliness in Islam, THE HASSANIAN LECTURES 217, 224 
(1990) (“The word ‘Islam’ comes from the same root as the words ‘Silm, Salm and Salam’ (they all mean peace) 
and ‘Salamah’ (security).”).  In Arabic, the vast majority of words are derived from a three letter root.  The three 
letters  –  –  form the root for both “salaam” (peace) and “Islam.”  THE HAHNS WEHR DICTIONARY OF 
MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC, A COMPACT VERSION OF THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
FOURTH EDITION 495-97 (J. MILTON COWAN, ED., 1994).
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 Abdallaoui, supra note 204, at 224 (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6 (“He is Allah, than Whom there is no 
other God, the Sovereign Lord, the Holy One, Peace.”)).
206 Id.
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 Mohammed Yessef, Foundations of Peace and Security in Islam, THE HASSANIAN LECTURES 224 (1996) 
(adding that “[p]eace must be promoted from the outset so that relations among people may be based on solid 
foundations, thereby making it possible for society to overcome all problems which may lead to social unrest and 
chaos, and so that people may accede peacefully to Dar as-Salam, in which you hear no offense or foolish talk, but 
only peace, peace.”).
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 Hadith of Abu Al Hassan Muslim Bin Abu Shiba, reproduced in Yessef, supra note 207, at 215.
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 ESPOSITO, supra note 113, at 88.
210 Dr. Abbas Al Jirari, The Concept of Coexistence in Islam, 14 ISLAM TODAY 28 (get date).
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This peace manifests itself in different ways and on different levels, all the way from simple daily 
acts such as greetings, to kind offerings of food, to financial assistance and charity, to peace on a global 
scale.211  In expounding his vision of Peace and Security in Islamic law, Professor Yessef follows a model 
very similar to Carl Wellman’s conception of third generation human rights, in which “[e]ach segment of 
the population, each category of people, indeed each individual has his own way of spreading peace.”212
Just as Wellman argues that third generation solidarity rights require the “concerted efforts of all the 
actors on the social scene,”213 Yessef recognizes that the burden to strive for social peace “must not be 
shouldered by the state alone.  The private sector must help the public authorities.”214
Several experts have discussed the Islamic conception of the elements of the right to Peace.  For 
example, in his 1990 Hassanian lecture,215 Professor Idris Alaoui Abdallaoui developed a right to 
international neighborliness with Islamic sources beginning with the following Hadith narrated by Imam 
Al Bukhari:  “Gabriel has recommended that I should take care of my neighbour so often that I began to 
think that he (Gabriel) wanted to make a heir of him (the neighbor).”216    Similarly, Dr. Abbas Al Jirari 
has discussed the right to Peace under the rubric of the concept of coexistence in Islam.217  In 
combination, these analyses emphasize three distinguishing elements of the right to peace in Islamic law.  
First, both Abdallaoui and Al Jirari discuss mutual understanding, an area that cannot be underestimated.  
Adballaoui states that “[t]he Almighty Creator justifies the fact of creating mankind [sic] by His desire 
211 See Yessef, supra note 207, at 222-24.  Professor Yessef, for example, notes the relation between peace and 
development:  “In a society crushed by poverty, want and indigence, it is not enough to tell people ‘assalamu 
alaikum.’ Rather the greeting must be coupled with concrete measures to alleviate their poverty.  Indigence is like a 
war waged by the needy.  Helping them out of the grip of poverty is a form of spreading peace.”  Id. at 223.  
Although international law commentators speaking on the right to development similarly speak of the “North-South 
divide” among rich and poor nations, the right to development and the right to Peace are still considered doctrinally 
distinct by human rights scholars.  Whereas so much dialogue among international law scholars regarding peace and 
security is stalled around the meaning of those terms in the UN Charter and their relation to self defense, the 
international human rights movement could greatly expand and improve its conception of the right to Peace by 
emphasizing Professor Yessef’s view, which duly recognizes the importance of equitable development to Peace.
212 Id..
213 See supra note 80.
214
 Yessef, supra note 207, at 223.
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that they know one another, as knowing one another leads to cooperation and fraternity.  There are 
different ways of getting to know one another and they all call for political, economical social and cultural 
cooperation in general,” citing the Holy Qur’an 49:13:  “O mankind!  Lo!  We have created you male and 
female and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another!”218  Al-Jirari cites this same 
verse to emphasize the importance of mutual understanding in Islam.219  This element of the Islamic 
conception of the right to peace is exemplary of the strong component of duty in a third generation right, a 
duty which falls both on the individual and the group.220
Related to mutual understanding, the second component of the right to peace in Islam is 
tolerance.  This is based in the belief by Muslims that the existence of cultural difference was the will of 
Allah, an idea which finds support in the Qur’an:  “And if they Lord had willed, He verily would have 
made mankind one nation, yet they cease not differing,”221 and “And of His signs is the creation of the 
heavens and the earth, and the differences of your languages and colours.”222  Based on these verses, Al 
218
 Abdallaoui, supra note 204, at 224 (citing HOLY QUR’AN, supra note 6, at 49:13).  See also Al Bukhari and 
Muslim, The Farewell Sermon (All of you are from Adam, and Adam was made from Clay. … No Arab shall be 
better than a non-Arab, a white better than a black, or a black than a white save in piousness.”) (cited in Altwaijri, 
supra note 15, at 17 n. 12).
219 Al Jirari, supra note 210, at 22-23.  See also Adbulaziz Othman Altwaijri, Identity and Globalization in the 
Perspective of the Right to Culturual Diversity, 15 ISLAM TODAY 13 (1998) (arguing that a full comprehension of 
inter-cultural diversity is essential to global peace).
220
 The individual has an obligation, for example, to make an effort to understand other cultures, so that her 
individual influence on national foreign-policy decisions will be as fair and informed as possible.  Similarly, the 
State (group) has a duty to provide its citizens with opportunities to fulfill their individual obligation towards mutual 
understanding.  This article was written under the support of a Fulbright Fellowship, a program which since 1946 
has had as its primary stated goal to “increase mutual understanding … through the exchange of persons, 
knowledge, and skills.”  The Fulbright Mission, online at 
http://www.iie.org/FulbrightTemplate.cfm?Section=Fulbright_Program_Overview (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).   By 
providing over 255,000 people a chance to experience, study, live in, and come to love another culture, Id., the 
Fulbright Fellowship program is an important step in the right direction towards State efforts to aid in individual 
international understanding.  But, the Fulbright program, available to only the smallest percentage of the population, 
can be only one of many efforts.  For example, States should strive to make additional contributions to individual 
international understanding by providing unbiased media and increased coverage of international issues in school 
curricula.  See Charles P. Henry, On Building a Human Rights Culture, in RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, 
supra note 24, at xvii, xxiii (arguing that inter-cultural education “sufficiently acquaints people of different kinds 
with one another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. … 
While such a goal is less grand than the construction of international legal standards, it seems to me a more honest 
place to start constructing a human rights culture”) (citing Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and 
Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (STEPHEN SHUTE & SUSAN HURLEY, EDS., 1993) (“The goal of 
this manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us.’”)).
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 Al Jirari, supra note 210, at 24 (citing HOLY QUR’AN Hûd: 118-119)
222 Id. (citing HOLY QUR’AN Romans 22).
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Jirari concludes that “God’s rule on earth is based upon the differences between human beings, be they 
race, language or religious differences or any other difference in any one of the components of 
civilization and culture.”223
One issue commonly raised in the context of tolerance is jihad (holy war), a concept frequently 
misunderstood by non-Muslims and misapplied by a select group of Muslim fundamentalists completely 
outside the context of Islamic law.224  According to Al Jirari, “Islam considers that the basic attitude of 
man is his inclination toward peace, and that recourse to war occurs only in absolutely necessary 
situations,” supporting this proposition with the Hadith reported by Al-Bukhari and Muslim, which states 
“He (Peace be Upon him) said “Do not wish to fight your enemy and ask for God’s forgiveness, if you do 
encounter him, call the name of God and be firm.’”225 Similarly, the Qur’an states “Oh You who believe, 
… cooperate in good and in pity, and do not cooperate in bad and aggression.”226  Interpreting jihad as 
recourse to war in the solitary case of self defense makes it the functional equivalent of Article 51 of the 
UN Charter, 227 a fundamental component of the international understanding of peace and security.
Finally, the third component in the Islamic conception of the right to peace as outlined by 
Abdallaoui is the importance of compliance regardless of weak enforcement mechanisms, a common 
concern for international law.  Abdallaoui explains that “international neighbourliness in islam is based 
on forgiveness. … because faith is based on good will and choice, not on compulsion, force, and 
constraint.”228  Similarly, he states that “If the jurists see that the international laws lack an important 
element which is compulsion, because there is no authority which is above all the nation and which can 
223 Id.
224 See Id. at 43.
225 Id.  at 44 (citing Hadith of Al-Bukhari and Muslim on the authority of Abu Hurayrah).
226 COLLOQUES, supra note 140, at 252 (“O vous qui croyez, … coopérez dans le bien et la piété, et ne coopérez 
pas dans le mal et l’agression. »).
227 Al Jirari, supra note 210 at 44 (citing UN Charter, supra note 197, at Art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to 
the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.”)).  
228 Abdallaoui, supra note 204, at 224.
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guarantee the respect of those international laws by force when it is necessary, Islam considers contracts 
and covenants of any kind as binding on the level of individuals as well as communities.”229  Moreover, 
he notes that the right to Peace “in Islam is based on keeping one’s vow, which is one of the principles of 
Islam and one of the bases of faith.”230
Abdallaoui’s focus on compliance strikes at international law’s perpetual Achille’s heal: 
enforcement.  Since the Peace of Westphalia, because the international legal system lacks an over-arching 
sovereign power, it has consistently struggled with convenient breaches of international law by self-
interested States situated to exact more benefit through breach than through adherence.   This trend has 
continued in the “new world order,” in which the the world’s only superpower violates Security Council 
resolutions or other international legal norms,231 weakens the International Criminal Court,232 disregards 
229 Id. at 227-28.
230 Id. at 226 (citing HOLY QUR’AN:  “O ye who believe!  Fulfill your undertakings.”)).
231 See, e.g., John Quigley, International Law Violations by the United States in the Middle East as a Factor Behind 
Anti-American Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 815 (2002); United States of America:  Hypocracy or Human 
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Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights affirmed that the use of the death penalty 
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law, has ignored such calls.”).
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CHI. J. INT'L L. 223 (2003); Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an 
International Criminal Court:  Is the Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National Criminal Jurisdictions?
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the pronouncements of the International Court of Justice,233 denies access to UN Special Rapporteurs,234
and fails to ratify235 or severely limits the effect of236 human rights treaties.  In a religious paradigm, such 
as Islamic law, compliance pull for otherwise non-justiciable moral duties237 is present and strong – it is 
Allah.238   By contrast, the secular human rights movement lacks any remotely comparable unifying force, 
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attributes such as life, creativity, power, mercy, and justice …, and of moral values to which a human society must 
be subject if it is to survive and prosper – a ceaseless struggle for the cause of the good.  This constant struggle is the 
keynote of man’s normative existence and constitutes the service (‘idabda) to God with which the Qur’an squarely 
and inexorably changes him.”).
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and the right to Peace, like other solidarity rights, is unfortunately likely to remain much more hortatory 
and aspirational.239
d. Conclusion
As Wellman has argued, solidarity rights are complex:  In addition to the elements of individual 
right and group duty present in first and second generation rights, third generation solidarity rights 
emphasize elements of group right and individual duty.  The vast majority of scholars considering 
solidarity rights concentrate on their group right element.  Although Islamic law does recognize group 
rights,240 it places paramount importance on individual duties, and thus provides an ideal paradigm within 
which further study of third generation solidarity rights becomes possible.  This emphasis on individual 
duty is clear in all three of the most common third generation human rights examined in this section.  It is 
a defining aspect of these rights as viewed from an Islamic perspective, carrying far greater weight than 
their “group right” component.  
While many scholars remain mired in a discussion of the problematic aspect of third generation 
solidarity rights’ “group right” component, a close examination of these rights shows that their 
“individual duty” aspect provides an even bigger barrier.  This barrier is eliminated in the context of 
religious law, such as Islamic law, by the compliance pull of God and religiosity itself.  For example, 
Professor Fazlur Rahman explains that the concept of taqwa, central to the morality of the Qur’an, “is 
239 Nevertheless, the very concept of solidarity rights is useful because they represent an increasing international 
emphasis on individual duty and group solidarity, strong evidence that some international human rights are moving 
towards non-western ideals.
240
 The Right of a community to group resources, including shared mineral wealth or the spoils of war, is 
represented in the Islamic concept of ghana’im.  KAMALI, supra note 92, at 349.  In addition, the right to 
retribution for past wrongs in Islamic law is a right not only of individuals but of the entire community, with the 
degree of community involvement varying with the degree of individual harm.  Id. at 350 (“The community is 
entitled to punish such violations, but the right of the heirs in retaliation and in diyah for erroneous killing, and the 
right of the victim in respect of diyah for injuries, is preponderant in view of the grievance and loss that they suffer 
as a result.  The guardian (wali) of the deceased, in the case of qisas, is entitled to pardon the offender or to accept a 
compensation from him.  But the state, which represents the community, is still entitled to punish the offender 
through a ta’zir punishment even if he is pardoned by the relatives of the deceased.”).  See also HOLY QUR’AN 
supra note 6, at 5:32 (“[W]hoever killed a human being, except as punishment for murder or other villainy in the 
land, shall be regarded as having killed all mankind; and that whoever saved a human life shall be regarded as 
having saved all mankind”) (cited in RAHMAN, supra note 8, at 144 (arguing that this sura “obviously makes 
murder a crime against society rather than a private crime against a family.”)).
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usually translated as ‘piety’ or ‘God-fearingness’ but which in the various Qur’anic contexts may be 
defined as ‘a mental state of responsibility from which an agent’s actions proceed but which recognizes 
that the criterion of judgment upon them lies outside him.’  … The idea of a secular law, insofar as it 
makes this state indifferent to its obedience, which is consequently conceived in mechanical terms, is the 
very abnegation of taqwa.”241  Because the secular human rights movement lacks such a motivating force 
to compel individual duties towards a communitarian whole, it is the “individual duty” component of 
third generation human rights that poses the greatest threat towards their existence.
V. Conclusion
Efforts of moderate cultural relativists to develop a core group of universal human rights based 
primarily on western conceptions are incomplete and should not stand alone.  If such a group of 
universally applicable human rights norms does exist, the search to discover it must begin in multiple 
legal traditions, for no culture can contain all the universal answers towards which all other cultures 
should aspire.  This article makes one such attempt, analyzing the extent to which the newest generation 
of human rights, the third generation solidarity rights, represent developing universal values based in non-
western traditions.  Finding a strong basis for, and rich understanding of, third generation rights in Islamic 
law, this article concludes that whereas other scholars have noted the complexities posed by the status of 
third-generation solidarity rights as “group rights,” the real complexity lies in their component of 
individual duties.  In Islam, where the individual is the vicegerent of God, a steward responsible for the 
interests of the community,242 individual duties to fulfill third generation solidarity rights become 
significantly stronger than their aspirational equivalents in international human rights law.  Because the 
secular human rights movement lacks any equivalent unifying force or compliance pull on individuals, 
the move towards solidarity rights is all the more remarkable, but also significantly more fragile.  Rather 
than criticizing the development of third-generation solidarity rights, international human rights 
241
 RAHMAN, supra note 8, at 155.
242
 Or, alternatively, the individual Muslim draws individual responsibility from other Islamic bases.  See supra 
notes 94-111 and accompanying text.
48
commentators should recognize them as developing universal values, with traditions such as Islamic law 
at their core.  
